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A Reply to Abramson’s Response to My “Beyond Mind” Papers
and Some Reflections on Wilber V
Elías Capriles
University of the Andes
Mérida, Venezuela

T

he critique of Wilber’s twentieth century works
presented in my three Beyond Mind papers
(Capriles, 2000, 2006, 2009) was written
because, upon reading the works in question, I perceived
in them misunderstandings of the theory and practice
of the higher Buddhist teachings in general and of the
Dzogchen teachings in particular that seemed so serious
to me, as to arouse an urge to respond to them. As to
subsequent Wilber works, I had no plans of addressing
them, partly because I was not inclined to read further
pieces of writing by the author in question (some of his
subjects—e.g., developmental psychology—are foreign
to my interests, as I do not find them relevant to spiritual
and/or transpersonal development, and on the other
hand I find his construal of Buddhism and many of
his views on subjects of my interest rather troubling),
partly because I did not foresee the turnabout that is
currently giving rise to Wilber V, and partly because
for a number of years now Venezuelan governmental
policies have made it quite difficult for me to buy books
in English—and hence I had to become selective and
procure only those books that it was imperative for me
to read in order to complete the various long works on
subjects not directly related to Wilber that I have been
preparing since the turn of the century.1
However, in the lapse between completion of
the last paper in the Beyond Mind series and the email
announcing that the paper was about to go through the
final editing by IJTS staff for it to go to press, I went
through a series of works by different authors—including
two Wilber pieces published in 2000 and one published
in 2009—which, upon receiving the news in question,
made me partially update the latest of my Beyond
Mind papers (Capriles, 2009), making additions and
corrections. Even though I was aware that Wilber was
undergoing a shift, I had not read most of the ensuing
works, and I made no moves to overcome difficulties and
procure them so as to be able to assess them, as I had no
intention to intellectually persecute Wilber—and, even

if I had been intent on critiquing all that he produced,
to procure and read his relevant newer works (provided
I could have managed to acquire them), and then carry
out the required, major overhauling of the paper, would
have been impossible in the short time at my disposal.
Then, after the publication of the final paper
in the series, author and webmaster of the website
Integral World Frank Visser2 cautioned me that the
Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2000, 2006, 2009)
and the books based on them could be dismissed for
failing to address the current Wilber. In response, I
prepared the preliminary discussion of Wilber V that
Visser published on his website (Capriles, 2010c). A few
months after that, Glenn Hartelius, current editor of the
IJTS, emailed me a reply to the Beyond Mind papers
written by reader John Abramson3 (2010) that criticized
me for failing to address Wilber V, and Hartelius urged
me to prepare a reply to the objections thus raised for a
future issue of the journal in question. These two facts
made me aware of the need to write this reply, and of
including it as a new section on Wilber V in the book
I was preparing: The Beyond Mind Papers: Transpersonal
and Metatranspersonal Theory (Capriles, in press).
However, a thorough assessment of Wilber V would
have filled a significant number of pages (perhaps less,
perhaps more than my assessment of the earlier Wilber),
would have made that book much longer than I had
originally promised the publishers, and would have
delayed its delivery far beyond the specified deadline.
Thus this reply to the objections in question—which
synthesize the piece published in Integral World and the
most relevant parts of the initial draft of my original
reply to Abramson—will only address general issues in
Wilber V and specific points of Abramson’s (2010) reply
to my papers.
Finally, I duly thank Mr. John Abramson for
offering me the possibility to confine myself to precise
themes of Wilber V, as well as for the tone of his valuable
reply (which, I must acknowledge, is kinder and more
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respectful than that of my objections to Wilber). I extend
my thanks to author-editors Frank Visser and Glenn
Hartelius for their roles in eliciting the production of
this reply and the corresponding book section.
A Reply to Abramson
(With a Preliminary Discussion of Wilber V)
he first thing to note is that, although Wilber
purportedly abandoned his former pantheistic
emanationism,4 he has still metaphysically posited
a transcendent reality (which, as clearly shown in
Appendix I to both Beyond Mind III [Capriles, 2009]
and the above mentioned upcoming book [Capriles, in
press], no Buddhist school or vehicle has ever posited)—
insisting that it should flavor the immanent while at the
same time being flavored by it. This is apparent in the
following passage by Wilber (Wilber & Cohen, 2002, p.
2), which Abramson (2010) cited:

Moreover, here Wilber continued to incur on
an error pointed out in my papers (which Abramson
overlooked in his review) and in the aforementioned
book—namely that of identifying sam
.    sāra with the
world of form, thereby implying nirvān.   a to be a formless
condition. The term world of form may be understood
in at least three different senses: (1) As whatever is
configured, including, (a) the continuum of the tsel
(rtsal) mode of manifestation of energy, which involves
the ever-changing configuration that samsaric beings
experience as phenomena of the physical universe, which
is manifest in most experiences of all three realms of
sam
. sāra (it is manifest in all experiences pertaining to

the realms of sensuality and form, and in most of those
pertaining to that of formlessness), but also in most
events of nonstatic nirvān. a; (b) the rölpa (rol pa) mode of
manifestation of energy, involving Thögel and Yangthik
visions—and possibly also some (c) phenomena of dang
(gdangs) energy such as mental images, as they manifest
in fantasy, imagination, visualization and so on;5 (2) as
all that involves the figure-ground division, which is
characteristic of two of the three realms of samsāra—
those of sensuality and form—but which could
repeatedly arise in the nirvān. a of higher vehicles as well;
and (3) as the samsaric realm of form, which excludes all
types of nirvān. a, but which may not be identified with
samsāra, for as just noted, the latter includes the other
two samsaric realms as well.
Therefore the nirvān. a of higher vehicles does
not exclude configurations of any of the three types
subsumed under (1), not does it need exclude the arising
of the figure-ground division discussed under (2). In
fact, the Direct Introduction proper to Dzogchen is an
initial disclosure of Dzogchen-qua-Base—that is, an
instance of Dzogchen-qua-Path—that as a rule, rather
than obliterating awareness (of) the sensory continuum,
enhances the awareness in question, making it far fresher
and more vivid. For its part, the supreme nirvān. a while
on the Path as it repeatedly manifests in the practice of
Tekchö (first stage in the practice of the Upadeśavarga
series of Dzogchen teachings), which consists in the
unconcealment as the dharmakāya of the true condition
of dang energy (i.e., of the basic stuff of thought), rather
than obliterating awareness (of) the sensory continuum,
results in a bare, fresh awareness (of) the latter. In
fact, the instant the dharmakāya manifests, whichever
thoughts that are occurring at the time—including the
superimposed thought-contents that in the preceding
moment were conditioning one’s experience—instantly
liberate themselves, dissolving like feathers entering fire
and thereby cleansing the doors of perception so that the
sensory continuum may appear as it (is): infinite and
holy rather than finite and corrupt. Likewise, higher
nirvān. a qua Fruit—including Dzogchen-qua-Fruit, the
Fruit of the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation
and the Fruit of the Mahāyāna—except during sleep
in the clear light, during the intermediate state of the
moment of death (Tib. chikhaï bardo [’chi kha’ i bar do])
and so on, does involve form in the sense listed as (1):
as that which from one samsaric perspective I called the
world’s dynamic configuration.
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the real key to this discussion, I think, is when you
understand that the only way you can permanently
and fully realize emptiness is if you transform, evolve,
or develop your vehicle in the world of form. The
vehicles that are going to realize emptiness have to be
up to the task. That means they have to be developed;
they have to be transformed and aligned with spiritual
realization. That means that the transcendent and the
immanent have to, in a sense, flavor each other ... . The
best of a nondual or integral realization is that we
have to basically work on both [the world of time and
“the timeless”]. We have to polish our capacity, in a
sense, to fully realize emptiness, moment to moment.
But it’s the emptiness of all forms arising moment
to moment. So we have to have a radical embrace of
the world of samsara as the vehicle and expression of
nirvana itself.

Consequently, Wilber is right in asserting
emptiness to be the emptiness of all the forms that
arise from moment to moment, yet he is incorrect in
identifying the forms in question with samsāra—just as
he is wrong in implicitly identifying nirvān. a with the
absence of form, for as noted above what disappears in
supreme nirvān. a is the threefold avidyā that in sam
. sāra
conceals and distorts the true condition of what samsaric
beings experience as the world’s configuration, and not
so the latter. Finally, both Dzogchen and Chán deny that
in order to permanently and fully realize emptiness one
must transform, evolve or develop what Wilber called our
vehicle—a term that Buddhism as a whole would reject, for
if one had a vehicle, then there would have to be someone
different from the vehicle to own it, drive it, and so forth,
but according to the most basic tenets of Buddhism such
owner-driver does not exist (and hence Buddhism refutes
it with sophisticated, compelling arguments which
include Candrakīrti’s Sevenfold reasoning). In fact, in
the vehicles in question, it is the recurrence of realization
that progressively transforms the person—making selfish
action gradually dwindle and selfless activity benefiting
others gradually increase; making the psyche constantly
gain in self-consistency; and progressively neutralizing
the proclivity for evil, self-encumbering and in general
the propensities for delusion and concealment, until
these are burned out and Buddhahood obtains. In
Dzogchen Atiyoga, that is precisely the function of the
repeated reGnition of Dzogchen-qua-Base referred to as
Dzogchen-qua-Path, just as in Chán it is the function
of the repeated realization of the absolute truth of the
Mahāyāna—that is, of the true condition of phenomena
(Skt. dharmatā; Tib. chöjing [chos bdyings]), of the allencompassing space where phenomena manifest (Skt.
dharmadhātu; Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]), of emptiness
(Skt. śūnyatā; Tib. tönpanyi [stong pa nyid]), and so forth
(which, as made clear in the Beyond Mind papers and
their respective notes, according to Tibetan Buddhists
other than Tsongkhapa and most of his followers, is not
the experience of nonexistence induced by a negation).6
Another of Abramson’s (2010) objections is the
following:
Capriles offered a definition of supreme spirituality
that would ostensibly include all authentic traditions
and overcomes the problems presented in Wilber’s
model: “all that is involved in the transition from
samsara to nirvana” ([Capriles, 2009,] p. 15). I have
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argued that Wilber would see such a definition as
partial. It apparently takes no account of Wilber’s
view that the generation of novel stages of human
consciousness in samsara is part of the “basic rule”
of spirituality which is the uniting of nirvān. a with
sam.  sara:
But the basic rule is: resting as emptiness,
embrace the entire world of form. And the
world of form is unfolding. It is evolving. It is
developing. And therefore resting as blissful
emptiness, you ecstatically embrace and push
against the world of form as a duty (Wilber,
2002b). (p. 184)
The above is related to the same problem
of identifying sam
sāra with the world of form and
.   
implicitly identifying nirvān. a with the absence of forms.
The truth is that for nearly all Tibetan Buddhists except
for Tsongkhapa and his followers, in the context of the
Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna, sam
.    sāra consists in relative
truth and nirvān. a in absolute truth, and relative truth
(the etymology of which, as shown in the Beyond Mind
papers and in the above-mentioned upcoming book of
mine, is obstruction to correctness / thoroughly confused)
absolutely lacks existence and truth—absolute truth
being the only truth there [is] (note that even though
the concept of the two truths is not widely used in the
Dzogchen teachings, these teachings agree that what the
Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna call relative truth is untrue
and nonexistent). As Gorampa put it (corresponding yet
not identical translation in Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 144145):7
The relative truths enunciated in those contexts
[e.g., in the texts of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti]
are nonexistent. Since [in absolute truth] there is
no erroneous apprehending subject, this subject’s
corresponding object—[relative truth]—does not
exist.
Thakchoe (2007, p. 145) rightly asserted this
view to be shared by Indian Master Jayānanda and
Tibetan Masters Rendawa, Shakya Chogden, Taktsang
Lotsawa, Kunchen Pema Karpo, Karmapa Mikyo
Dorje, Ju Mipham, and Gendün Chöphel. However,
the view in question is not only an interpretation by
these Masters, for it is the original view of Nāgārjuna,
Āryadeva, and Candrakīrti, as well as of the Tibetan
Master Dölpopa and of nearly all Tibetans who do not
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follow Je Tsongkhapa—and, most important, it is the
one found in the Dzogchen teachings.
At any rate, the relative, albeit nonexistent,
inescapably produces suffering, and although both
suffering and the one who suffers are untrue and
nonexistent, in sam
. sāra both suffering and the one who
suffers are experienced as absolutely true and important—
the very raison d’ être of Buddhism being that of putting
a definitive end to suffering. It does so in the only way
possible: by realizing, in nonstatic nirvān. a, the absolute
truth that is the only truth there is, in which neither
suffering nor one who suffers or enjoys are experienced,
and then coming to the point at which one no longer
departs from this truth—never again having the delusive
experience of relative truth and the suffering it implies.
In fact, since the relative truth that corresponds to
sam
.   sāra and that is a thoroughly confused perspective and
an obstruction to correctness is utterly nonexistent and
as such untrue, there is nothing different from nirvān. a
for the latter to embrace: though in sam
.   sāra a duality
between sam
sāra
and
nirvān
a
is
perceived
by those who
.
.
have embraced the Buddhist or other similar teachings,
in nonstatic nirvān. a—both as it manifest on the Path
and as the Fruit of Buddhahood that consists in the
uninterrupted manifestation of the svabhāvikāya that was
discussed in the evaluation of Wilber IV’s four last fulcra
in the Beyond Mind papers and the upcoming book—
nothing that is not the absolute truth is apprehended
and hence no relative truth and no samsāra, and hence
no duality between sam
.     sāra and nirvān. a, is perceived.
In the words of Kunkhyen Pema Karpo (corresponding
yet not identical translation in Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 145146):8

samsāra-sustaining craving that Śākyamuni in the
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, and Nāgārjuna and his successors
in their Prajñāpāramitā-based Mādhyamaka philosophy,
expressed in samsaric, relative terms the perspective of
nirvān. a from which there is no duality between sam
.   sāra
and nirvān. a.
Abramson’s objection is very similar to the
criticism of my position that a Nepalese spiritual
teacher made in an earlier version of the Transpersonal
Psychology entry of Wikipedia, which objected that:
They (Elias Capriles and others) too misses [sic}
the game ’cause don’t they know what Nagarjuna
among many [B]uddhist siddhas say “Where there
is neither an addition of nirvana nor a removal of
samsara; There, what samsara is discriminated from
what nirvana?”9

However, the knowledge that the only way
to definitively quench suffering is to attain nirvān. a is
likely to turn other forms of craving (Skt. tr. s.na; Pāli,
tan. hā) into craving for self-annihilation in nirvān. a
(Skt. vibhavātr. .sna; Pāli, vibhava-tan. hā)—which would
sustain samsāra, forestalling the occurrence of nirvān. a.
It was merely as an intellectual means to neuter this

The only truth has always been the absolute
truth, and hence realization of this truth does not
add anything to what (was) there from beginningless
time, whereas relative truth never existed in truth and
hence its elimination could not remove anything from
whatever (was) there from beginningless time. Likewise,
since relative truth / sam
.   sāra never existed, and nirvān. a
is so only in relation to samsāra, there is nothing to
discriminate. However, Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyāna
Buddhist, and as such he wrote all that he wrote in order
to lead beings from sam
.   sāra to nonstatic nirvān. a and
thus to put an end to the excruciatingly painful illusion
of suffering and one who suffers—rather than going
to sleep because, since all beings had always been in
nirvān. a, there was simply nothing to do. Therefore, he
fully agreed that if one mistakes for nirvān. a the higher
realms of samsāra—or the base-of-all where neither
sam
. s āra nor nirvān. a are active but that technically
pertains to samsāra, for that matter10 —one will not have
even the slightest chance to “attain” nirvān.a and thus to
put an end to illusory sam
. s āra with the equally illusory
yet excruciating suffering and pain it involves. In fact,
Buddhism arose because Siddhārtha Gautama realized
that his teachers ascended to high samsaric realms—the
second, Udraka Rāmaputra (Or Udrako Rāmaputro),
reaching to the peak of samsāra—but did not go beyond
samsāra, and aware that this did not represent a true
liberation he went on to seek the way to put an end to
samsāra, “attaining” nonstatic nirvān. a—which then
made him realize that there was neither a sam
. s āra to
transcend not a nirvān. a to attain.
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To the extent that remaining obstructions subsist, to
that extent multifaceted appearances are perceived
during post-Contemplation as illusory, and so forth.
However, from the moment all latencies [of previous
defilements] are totally [eliminated], relative
phenomena are never again perceived. Instead, one
ceaselessly dwells on the essence of Contemplation.

The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and Nāgārjuna’s
Mādhyamaka philosophy expressed in concepts the
realization of the nonduality of sam
.      s āra and nirvān. a that
takes place in nonstatic nirvān.a as part of an intellectual,
logical method to lead beyond the intellect and its
logical fetters. This approach—as valid as many other
Buddhist approaches—is in stark contrast with that of
the Dzogchen Path, which consists in creating, at the
very onset of the Path, the conditions for an extreme
experience of sam
. s āra to occur and be immediately
followed by an instance of the supreme nonstatic nirvān.a
referred to as Dzogchen-qua-Path, so that the individual
may, by the same token, have a taste of the spontaneous
liberation of Dzogchen, become familiar with the
difference between sam
. s āra and nirvān. a as perceived
from the perspective of samsāra, and in the realization
of nonstatic nirvān. a discover the nonduality of sam
. s āra
and nirvān. a that is realized in nonstatic nirvān. a only.
Repetition of this should eliminate all doubts as to the
fact that the true condition of reality is the one that
became patent in nonstatic nirvān. a—and hence that
there is no duality between sam
. s āra and nirvān. a. Once
all such doubts have been eliminated, the practitioner is
introduced to special yogic means that help all samsaric
experiences free themselves spontaneously in nirvān. a.
Realizing the nonduality of sam
. sāra and nirvān. a
without going beyond sam
s
āra
in
the
occurrence of
.
nonstatic nirvān. a is of little use, for so long as sam
. sāra
is manifest, realization of the nonduality of sam
sāra
and
.
nirvān. a cannot be more than an intellectual realization
pertaining to relative truth that as such is delusive (i.e., it
is an obstruction to correctness in one who is thoroughly
confused), which therefore sustains samsāra. Is this that the
two critics under discussion want higher Buddhism to
achieve?
Then there is the question of whether the above
perspective may be categorized as ascending, as Abramson
suggested. Throughout the papers the latter was replying to,
I made it entirely clear that the sense in which Wilber used
the terms ascent and descent is, to say the least, out-and-out
secondary in comparison with the metaphenomenological
and metaexistential meanings I give these terms—yet
all these arguments do not seem to have been taken
into account in Abramson’s reply. Moreover, not even
in Wilber’s sense may the view expounded above be
characterized as ascending, for it does not urge beings to
set out to climb toward nirvān.a in order to escape from
sam. sāra (a project that, as noted above, since it would

As to how Wilber wove into some of his
theories an explanation of the Tantric Buddhist and the
Dzogchen concepts of emptiness, below, in the discussion
of Abramson’s (2010) defense of what were previously
Wilber’s last four fulcra and which are now his final four
stages of cognitive development, and in some of the notes
to it, I showed that Wilber did not distinguish between
the different understandings of emptiness. In particular,
the author Wilber cited as his source for his explanation
of the successive attainment of the four kāyas and hence
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sustain the relative truth that is the essence of samsāra,
would do no more than sustain samsāra): whereas in the
relative reality of sam. sāra there seems to be something to
escape from, someone to carry out the escape, an escape,
and somewhere to escape to, the reason why methods
that make it possible for samsaric experience to initially
dissolve, so that absolute truth may be realized in nonstatic
nirvān.a, are applied on the Dzogchen Path, is that only this
realization proves that there was never a relative truth or a
sam
.    sāra to escape from and a nirvān.a to attain, and hence
that there is no duality between these two conditions—a
method that, by comparison, shows the mere intellectual
idea of this fact to lack ultimate relevance. In fact, since
there is no relative truth or sam.     sāra to embrace, only this
realization may validly (albeit metaphorically) be called
“embracing samsāra.”
Besides trying to show the view I expound to
be ascending in Wilber’s sense of the term, Abramson
(2010) attempted to show Wilber V’s position not to be
ascending in the senses I give this term:
Wilber’s (2001) end note 1 in Sex, Ecology and Spirituality. … is concerned with Wilber’s explanation
of the Buddhist “no-self” but its relevance here is
the way Wilber weaves some of his theories with an
explanation of the Tantric and the Dzogchen Buddhist concepts of emptiness, and how this relates to
the nondual state. For example, in relation to Dzogchen, and seemingly in accord with Capriles’ work,
Wilber commented:
Different meditation practices engineer different
states and different experiences, but pure Presence itself is unwavering, and thus the highest
approach in Dzogchen is “Buddhahood without
meditation”: not the creation but rather the direct recognition of an already perfectly present
and freely given primordial Purity.” (Wilber,
2001, pp. 730-731)

of the last four fulcra of his former system and of what
now are the last four stages of the cognitive line of
development, purportedly follows Tsongkhapa, whose
understanding of emptiness was radically different from
Wilber’s, as well as, (a) from that of Tibetan Masters
who are not Tsongkhapa’s followers, (b) from the two
senses of emptiness in the Dzogchen teachings (namely
that of emptiness as the Base’s primordial purity and that
of emptiness a mere illusory experience), and (c) from
emptiness of substances other than the absolute.11 (I will
touch upon this point once more below.)
As to the Wilber passage cited by Abramson
and reproduced above, it no doubt acknowledges that
realization cannot be produced or constructed, yet this
understanding is in diametral opposition to Wilber’s
structural paradigm and metaphenomenologically
ascending view, which as shown throughout the
Beyond Mind papers is incompatible with the
metaphenomenologically descending stance of Buddhism
in general and of Dzogchen in particular—and which,
as shown here, Wilber has continued to uphold. Thus
if it proves anything, it is that Wilber has continued to
contradict himself—as evinced by Abramson’s (2010)
reply, for the passage Abramson cited outright contradicts
the following assertion he made:

Awakening is attained without meditation yet
meditation is the best way to achieve stage development,
which is indispensable for being able to attain Awakening:
the contradiction is blatant. Furthermore, although the
fact that Wilber acknowledged that stage development
may occur as a by-product of meditation seems positive, in
a passage cited above he explicitly wrote that, “the only way
you can permanently and fully realize emptiness is if you
transform, evolve, or develop your vehicle in the world of
form”—which seems to imply that one must contrivedly
undertake specific actions in order to transform what
he referred to as “our vehicle,” rather than waiting for it

to take place spontaneously as an effect of meditation.
At any rate, the core problem for me continues to be
his strong overvaluation of stage development—which
outright conflicts with the metaphenomenological,
metaexistential approach, and fails to account for the
cases of child prodigies like Mingyur Dorje (the Namchö
Tertön [nam chos gter ston; in full, nam mkha’ i chos gter
ston] in whom Dzogchen-qua-Path initially manifested
during childhood and whose realization soared during
his early teens). Most important, though now he has
claimed that Buddhahood is “not the creation but rather
the direct recognition of an already perfectly present and
freely given primordial Purity,” (Wilber, 2001, pp. 730731, as cited by Abramson, 2010) he has continued to
explain it as the creation of a structure—which, being
created, according to Buddhist doctrine must necessarily
be impermanent and must necessarily pertain to samsāra.
(Note that primordial purity is a concept employed in the
Dzogchen teachings and borrowed by the Anuyogatantra
of the Nyingmapa, the validity of which Wilber’s source
rejects, and that therefore Wilber would have to choose
between, [a] using that source for establishing the
progressive attainment of the four kāyas and hence of the
last four fulcra of his former system and of what now are
the last four stages of the cognitive line of development,
or [b] employing the concept of primordial purity that
his source abhors and which originally pertained to the
Dzogchen teachings, according to which the progression
of attainment of the four kāyas occurs in an order
contrary to the one posited by Wilber and his source.)
Furthermore, I am surprised that, right after
asserting that Wilber does not consider that stage
development should be pursued in addition to following
an authentic spiritual Path, for it will be furthered by the
meditations practiced in most spiritual Paths, Abramson
asked himself whether I consider that, “stage development
should be pursued in addition to following an authentic
spiritual Path.” My surprise does not arise so much from
the fact that the words in addition to outright contradict
the above claim that the best way to achieve stage development
is through the practice of meditation, as from the fact that
throughout the papers Abramson reviewed I emphasized the
metaphenomenological, metaexistential view, repeatedly
making the point that so-called “stage development” has
little to do with Awakening, and that in Dzogchen Atiyoga
(where the recurrence of Dzogchen-qua-Path spontaneously
brings about a most significant transformation, and where,
as clearly shown in papers in the Beyond Mind series, this
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It is certainly illuminating to consider further
why Wilber feels stage development is important,
beginning with one way he feels it can be achieved.
Wilber muddies the water by claiming that
practising meditation is the best, or among the best,
means of achieving stage development; in which
case following an authentic spiritual path involving
meditation practice would automatically result in
stage progression, and the issue of pursuing stage
development would be redundant.

recurrence can begin in children who have made very little
stage development in Wilber’s sense) and other Paths that
are not gradual there are no rigid stages of realization—
the only sequence the Dzogchen teachings posit being
that
of
dharmakāya–sambhogakāya–nirmān. akāya,12
which is the opposite of the one both Wilber and his
source establish (a fact that Abramson overlooked in spite
of being more conspicuous than many of the points of my
system he commented on). Moreover, no Buddhist Path or
School has ever asserted its successive stages of realization
to necessarily manifest after the attainment of the higher
stages of psychological development or, even less so, posited
all-embracing developmental schemas (indeed, no such Path
or School has ever been concerned with what nowadays is
called developmental psychology). (Wilber V’s other lines of
development are briefly described in the note indicated by
the reference mark at the end of this paragraph.)13
With regard to the change undergone by
Wilber’s structural approach to cognitive and spiritual
development, Abramson (2010) cited Michael Daniels’
(2009) account:

explained by memes? Dawkins provides no examples
and I suspect there aren’t any. The truth is that
the meme idea, though a quarter-century old, has
inspired next to no serious research and has failed to
establish a place for itself in mainstream cognitive
science, psychology, or sociology. Though laymen
often have the impression that scientific ideas die
in decisive experiments, far more often they die
because they didn’t suggest many experiments. They
failed, that is, to inspire a rich research program.
Though I could obviously be proved wrong, and
while I have no problem with the notion that some
science of cultural change may be possible, I’m far
less confident than Dawkins that memes will play
an important role in any such enterprise.

the selfish meme view hasn’t led anywhere. Where
are the puzzling phenomena that have been

As Richard Carlson (n.d.) has suggested
(substantiating his view in a most informed manner),
Wilber’s and Cowan’s evolutionary views seem to stem
from their right wing, elitist political stance—which
as such, I feel compelled to add, could hardly be more
anti-ecological. Since this is not the place to carry out a
detailed discussion of this subject (a longer one, though
not exhaustive, will appear in the upcoming definitive
version of my Beyond History [Capriles, 2007a, Vol. III],
where I scrupulously draw an ecophilosophy of history
and political ecophilosophy), suffice to note that Wilber’s
paradigmatic example of an “integral politician” is Tony
Blair—whose “integrity” revealed itself in his lying to the
UK Parliament in order to falsely substantiate his plans
to invade Iraq and unleash the spree of destruction that
killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and gravely affected
our planet’s ecosystem (not only through the CO2 added
to the atmosphere, but even more so through the use of
depleted uranium warheads that has multiplied cancer
incidence rates among Iraqi children). Moreover, Wilber
spoke of George W. Bush (“even if one does not agree
with him”) and the (far less extremist) General Colin
Powell approvingly—in this way implicitly justifying the
aggression to the Iraqi people they engineered, as well
as Bush’s environmental policies (including his drive to
drill in Alaska and all the rest), and so on. Also, instead
of outlining a green political program, he has favored
the achievement of a synthesis of the views of two of
U.S. Presidents who refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol
(one of whom, besides, was responsible for unleashing
the Iraq war) and those of Blair’s and of politicians from
other countries in order to
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What [Wilber] is saying is [that he was] wrong [in]
that he made the mistake—and he admits this very
explicitly in the book—of simply adding the stages
of the Eastern meditation techniques on top of the
stages of the Western psychological model. And he
says it almost flippantly in the book:
So … what we did was simply to take the
highest stage in Western psychological models
… and then take the three or four major stages
of meditation (gross, subtle, causal, nondual) …
and stack those stages on top of the other stages
… East and West integrated! (Wilber, 2007, p.
88)
However, Wilber V retains and further develops
his and Don Beck’s version of spiral dynamics as a
paradigm of human evolution that supposedly works
for ontogenic development as much as phylogenetic
evolution, and thus his new system does not radically
break away from the structural developmental paradigm
criticized above. The paradigm in question is based on
the theory of memes as defined by biologist Richard
Dawkins, about which biology Professor H. Allen Orr
(2004) wrote (in Carlson, n.d.):14

How can Wilber, in spite of the Bush
administration’s environmental, social, and international
record, reproduce G. W. Bush’s Newspeak categorization
of his own stance as “Compassionate Conservatism”?
Wilber ads have referred to him as the “Einstein of
consciousness;” it seems to me that the above suggests
that a more correct label for him would be that of the
“[Yoshihiro Francis] Fukuyama of consciousness”15 (with
regard with Wilber’s political ideas and, in particular,
the war in Iraq, cf. also Wilber, 2009).
As to Wilber V’s structural developmental and
evolutionary paradigm, in his diagram and exposition of
his view of ontogenic unfolding (Wilber, 2007), the first
line of development is the cognitive one, which, building
on Piaget, has as its lowest rung the sensorimotor; as
its second rung, the preoperational / symbolic; as the
third, the preoperational / conceptual; as the fourth,
the concrete operational; as the fifth, the formal
operational; and as the sixth, that of early vision-logic,
which he categorized as metasystemic—these six, and
the stages at the same level in all other lines, occupying
the diagram’s first tier. Then the seventh rung is named
middle vision-logic, categorized as paradigmatic, and
the eighth is labeled late vision-logic and declared to be
cross-paradigmatic—these two filling the second tier.
Following that—in the third tier—what one finds is
no more than a repeat of the preceding Wilber, for the
ninth, called global mind, is no other than what Wilber
previously called the psychic level; the tenth is metamind, which is what he formerly called the subtle level;
the eleventh is overmind, which is no other than what
he previously called the causal level; and the twelfth is
the supermind, which is what he formerly called the
nondual (the names of the last two rungs having been
used by “integral” Master Śrī Aurobindo—to whose leftwing social concerns and proposals, as Carlson [n.d.] has
noted, Wilber has never alluded16).
So it is clear that, as noted above, in spite of
the greater flexibility of his newer model, and in spite
of the above-quoted self-criticism of admitting that

he had taken the highest stage in models of Western
developmental psychology and then stacked (what he
viewed as) the three or four major stages of meditation on
top of it, Wilber is still positing a schema of hierarchical
structures, and is still adding what he apparently believes
to be the final stages of realization in higher Buddhism,
Vedānta, Integral Yoga and so on, to what he holds to be
the standard stages of cognitive ontogenic development.
Yet his final stages of realization are at odds with higher
Buddhism, as systematically explained in the Beyond
Mind papers. In fact, Wilber has continued to wrongly
identify the final four levels in the ontogenic, cognitive
line of development—which as just noted continue to
be the four last fulcra of his preceding schema—with
the four kāyas as these are said to successively occur in
vehicles of the Path of Transformation. This amounts
to the negation of the possibility of attaining the far
higher realizations of Dzogchen Atiyoga, for as shown
in the Beyond Mind papers, the Ati Path of spontaneous
liberation begins with a Direct Introduction to the
condition that the Path of Transformation calls
svabhāvikāya and posits as its last, final attainment,
but which on the Path of Ati is no more than the
precondition of its practice, and which in the Menngagde
or Upadeśavarga series of teachings, is prior both to the
practice of Tekchö (khregs chod) that establishes the
dharmakāya and to the subsequent practice of Thögel
(thod rgal) that establishes the sambhogakāya and that
at the end begets the nirmān.akāya—thus establishing
the Atiyoga svabhāvikāya (which signifies that the
sambhogakāya and nirmān.akāya of Dzogchen Ati are
levels of realization that stand far beyond the final level
of realization of the inner Tantras of Transformation
and by no means can be attained through the methods
of these Tantras; Namkhai Norbu, n.p.; Capriles, 2000,
2003, 2006, 2009, in press). The fact that Wilber has
completely overlooked the Dzogchen kāyas and the
sequence in which they manifest, even though he seems
to acknowledge Atiyoga to be the highest Path, is most
strange, to say the least.
In the last pages of Abramson’s (2010) paper,
the author recurrently reiterated the assertion that the
previous last four fulcra that are now the last four levels
of the cognitive line of development, do correspond to
the four kāyas as progressively realized on the Tantric
Path of Transformation. True enough, as clearly stated
in the Beyond Mind papers, a sequence of realization
beginning with nirmān.akāya, continuing with
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find a “Third Way” that unites the best of liberal
and conservative—President Clinton’s Vital Center,
George W. Bush’s Compassionate Conservatism,
Germany’s Neue Mitte [uniting Gerhard Schroeder
and Angela Merkel], Tony Blair’s Third Way, and
Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, to name a few.
(Wilber, 2000, n.p.)

sambhogakāya and then dharmakāya, and concluding
in the svabhāvikāya that consists in the indivisibility of
the first three kāyas, is posited in the Buddhist Tantras
of the Path of Transformation. It is surprising that
Abramson overlooked the fact, which I strongly stressed
in the Beyond Mind papers and which I intend to
emphasize again at this point (rather than merely noting
that Wilber overlooked the sequence of realization of the
kāyas characteristic of the supreme vehicle and posited
a sequence characteristic of lower vehicles), that Wilber
described the kāyas in a way that is at odds with the
conception and explanation of those kāyas proper to the
Tantras that make up Path of Transformation. As to how
he produced such a bizarre concoction, I had found no
clue in his works (including Wilber, 1995, 1996, which
were my sources for my critique of what formerly were
his last four fulcra). However, Abramson’s (2010) reply
to the Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2000c, 2006,
2009), mentioned the name of the author that, in the
second edition of his 1995 book Sex, Ecology, Spirituality
(Wilber 2001b)—to which I have not had access so
far17—Wilber gave as the source for his understanding
of the kāyas, and reproduced some passages by Wilber
(2001b) in which he cited the source in question. I
must admit I was shocked, for the name Wilber gave is
that of the most controversial character within Tibetan
Buddhism.19 The mention of this source can offer the
occasion for pointing out two of the genuine problems
with his concoction:
(1) The first is that Wilber’s descriptions of the
fulcra he identified with the kāyas fail to match the way
the latter are described in the Anuttarayogatantras and
in the writings of Je Tsongkhapa—the latter being,
as repeatedly stated, the source of the controversial
character that Wilber claimed to have taken as his source.
Among the views of Wilber that I have denounced as
failures, there is a particular one, however, that could
be explained by the fact that Wilber drew from that
particular source—namely his description of the
svābhāvikāya. In fact, contradicting his predecessors in
the rest of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, Tsongkhapa
asserted the svābhāvikāya / Buddhahood to involve the
perception of relative reality. The reason for this oddity
is Tsongkhapa’s peculiar understanding of Prāsangika
Mādhyamaka, according to which entities are not empty
of their being this or that entity (and hence they are the
entity referred to by their names), but only of inherent /
hypostatic / reified existence, and hence after delusion

were eradicated, there would still be a relative reality
comprising men, women, horses, trees, mountains,
pillars, tables, and the rest of phenomena (lam rim chen
mo, passim; cf. Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 48-53), yet no relative
phenomenon whatsoever would be misperceived as
inherently / hypostatically existing.20 Since Tsongkhapa
and his followers assert relative reality to persist after the
eradication of delusion, they relativize Buddhahood by
claiming that in it relative and ultimate truth manifest
simultaneously (cf., for example, Thakchoe, 2007, pp.
46-58; also ff.)—being, in fact, the only important
Buddhists who, so far as I know, uphold this view. (Note
that I am not implying that the continuum of sensory
appearances dissolves upon Awakening; what actually
happens is that Buddhas no longer experience any
segment of the sensory continuum as being this or that,
yet they can certainly pinpoint this or that, and make far
more precise distinctions than ordinary beings—their
verbal expressions being other-directed assertions (Tib.
zhenngo khelen [gzhan ngo khas len],21 which means that
they make them without believing them from the heart
to be either true or false.)
However, the above does not account for the rest
of the odd explanation of the kāyas and their sequence of
manifestation in the Anuttarayogatantras that Wilber gave
in his peculiar description of his last four fulcra, for no one
within Tibetan Buddhism would assert the nirmān.akāya
to be realized when, while contemplating nature and
without any apparent reason, the feeling of separateness
spontaneously dissolves for a while (whether this means
that the illusion that a mental subject separate from nature
is perceiving the latter has dissolved, or that the mental
subject has identified with the object), as Wilber did in
his discussion of fulcrum 7 / gross mysticism; moreover,
Wilber’s description of this fulcrum and corresponding
type of mysticism in part fits the experiences of the
samsaric formless realms that are the first stage in the
arising of sam
. sāra from the neutral condition of base-ofall and in part fits the neutral condition in question, both
of which, as shown again and again, are non-nirvanic
conditions that are often mistaken for the dharmakāya
(for the confusion of the experiences of the formless
realms with the dharmakāya, cf. Kyeme Dechen [skye
med bde chen] and Karma Thinle [kar ma phrin las]’s
notes to Saraha [in Guenther, 1973]; for the confusion
of the dharmakāya with the base-of-all, cf. the cite from
Kunkhyen Jigme Lingpa [“all-knowing”; kun mkhyen jigs
med gling pa] in Guenther, 1977, pp. 142-147: “Those who
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do not understand it in this way and take the base-of-all for
the dharmakāya are like blind men without a guide, erring
about in a desert. As they are deluded about the nature of
the Base and the Fruit, the Path by which Buddhahood
can be realized in one lifetime has been blocked. Samaya.”
Note that the all-knowing teacher prophesied that this
confusion would be a common error in our time)—yet are
never mistaken for the nirmān.akāya, for which what are
often mistaken are specific experiences of higher regions of
the samsaric realm of sensuality (cf. Kyeme Dechen’s and
Karma Thinle’s commentaries to Saraha, in Guenther,
1973) or the consciousness of defilements (in the sense the
Dzogchen teachings give the term in the same context)
that precedes experience of the realm of sensuality in the
arising of sam
.   sāra from the base-of-all.
For its part, Wilber’s description of his fulcrum
8 / subtle mysticism fails to distinguish between the
sambhogakāya, the experiences of the samsaric realm
of form (cf. Kyeme Dechen’s and Karma Thinle’s
commentaries to Saraha, in Guenther, 1973), and the
consciousness of the base-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes or kun
gzhi rnam par shes pa; Skt. ālayavijñāna) that immediately
precedes the latter in the arising of sam
.  sāra from the
neutral base-of-all (in the sense the Dzogchen teachings
give the term in this context).
Also, Wilber’s description of his fulcrum 9
/ causal mysticism (a term that could hardly be more
absurd, as the dharmakāya with which he identifies it
is that which has no cause and cannot be itself a cause),
and which he categorized as formless, fails to distinguish
between the dharmakāya, the experiences of the samsaric
formless realms, and instances of the base-of-all in the
Dzogchen sense of a condition where neither sam
.  sara
nor nirvān.a are active—to which, as shown in the
discussion of these fulcra in the last two of the Beyond
Mind papers and as may be inferred from a passage from a
Mahāyāna scriptural source quoted in that discussion, both
the nirodhasamāpatti and many of the nirvikalpa samādhis
he gives as cases of this fulcrum pertain: the dharmakāya
is not a condition of nirodha or cessation in the sense of
lack of manifestation or blankness,22 and in particular no
one would assert it to correspond to the nirodhasamāpatti
that according to the Theravāda pertains to nirvān.a. (In
what regards Wilber’s categorization of the dharmakāya
as a formless condition, I concede that it may derive from
Anuttarayogatantra descriptions of the arising of the clear
light that follows the dissolution of the winds in the central
channel—which Tsongkhapa explained as the emergence

of “the most subtle mind of clear light”—after the stopping
of the coarse levels of consciousness. However, that in
Anuttarayogatantra the kāya in question may initially
manifests in a formless, luminous condition does not at
all imply that it may be reduced to a formless, luminous
condition—just as the fact that satori (Chin.–Hànyǔ
Pīnyīn, wù; Wade-Giles, wu) may manifest following kōan
(Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, gōng’ àn; Wade-Giles kung-an) study
does not mean it may be categorized as an event that occurs
following kōan study. In the same way, that coarse levels of
consciousness stop in the Anuttarayogatantras’ realization
of the dharmakāya does not at all mean that the latter may
be reduced to the nirodhasamāpatti of the Theravādin
tradition: the Mahāyāna Sūtras, śāstras and so on make
it clear that in the vehicle in question nirodhasamāpatti
constitutes a deviation.)
In general, many other aspects of Wilber’s
descriptions of the kāyas are not based on the teachings
of any reputed Buddhist author and Master—and, in
general, the descriptions in question are blatantly selfcontradictory, and the universalization of the sequence
of their arising as explained in the Tantras of the Path
of Transformation is wholly unwarranted. Thus it is a
fact that Wilber has continued to reproduce many of the
mix-ups denounced in the assessment of these fulcra in
the last two Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2006, 2009),
which thus fail to correspond to the higher Buddhist
realizations with which he has identified them—or to
stages in other ancient, traditional systems directed at
Awakening, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, for
that matter. In Wilber V, Wilber has continued to piece
together elements from different traditions—not only
from different religions, but also from different Buddhist
vehicles and schools, thus being comparable to one who,
by piecing together the head of an elephant, a snake’s
body, and a human intellect, produces a monster existing
solely in his or her imagination. (Finally, as clearly stated
in the Beyond Mind papers and the book collecting the
points made in them, if Wilber follows the source he
mentions, then he should flatly reject the validity of the
Dzogchen teachings and the Anuyogatantra, as surely
does that source, and by the same token he should shun
the Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Jonangpa [jo nang
pa] teachings as a whole, because—as illustrated with a
quote from Kunchen Pema Karpo and another one from
Gorampa in this reply—these agree that in Buddhahood
only the absolute truth manifests, as the relative no
longer does so.)
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(2) Since, as noted repeatedly, Wilber’s source
followed Je Tsongkhapa’s peculiar understanding
of Mādhyamaka Prāsangika, his view of emptiness
outright contradicts his source’s. In fact, Je Tsongkhapa
regarded as ultimate truth emptiness qua emptiness of
self-existence (Skt. svabhāva śūnyatā; Tib. rangzhingyi
tongpanyi [rang bzhing gyis stong pa nyid]—except in Je
Tsongkhapa, who preferred to render it as rangzhingyi
madrubpa [rang bzhin gyis ma grub pa]: the term
criticized in Gendün Chöphel, 2005; Gendün Chöphel
& Capriles, in press; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zìxìngkòng;
Chin. Wade-Giles, tzu-hsing-k’ung; Jap. jishōkū) as
true ultimate truth (Skt. śūnyatā; Tib. tongpanyi [stong
pa nyid]; Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, kòng; Chin. WadeGiles, k’ung; Jap. kū). However, unlike Wilber, nearly
all Tibetan Prāsangika Masters except for his followers,
and the Dzogchen teachings, Tsongkhapa defined
emptiness as the absence of inherent existence23 —that is,
as the absence of the mistaken mode of existence that
deluded beings project on what he himself called merely
existing phenomena (a concept not found in the original
Prāsangika teachings),24 thereby experiencing the latter as
existing intrinsically, in their own right—and claimed that
the ultimate truth as it manifests on the Path consisted in
getting this absence of inherent existence to become present
to the meditator (i.e., to become an object of cognition)
in the practice of insight (Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong
[lhag mthong]; Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, guān; Wade-Giles,
kuan; Jap. kan) meditation that he taught in the Lamrim
Chenmo and the other Lamrim books. Furthermore, as
already noted, since a mere absence cannot bear or create
anything, this view frontally contradicts Wilber’s (2007)
view of emptiness as a creative principle that generates
all there is and hence as being the same as Ayin25 —a
view that Wilber V reiterated as follows:

Let me emphasize once more that the phenomena
of sam
  
s
āra
and the qualities of nirvān.a cannot be borne
.
or created by a mere absence (of inherent existence or
whatever) such as Tsongkhapa’s emptiness. Moreover,
Wilber wrote (Wilber & Cohen, 2005, p. 3), “emptiness

or the unborn or the changeless ground,” thus implying
emptiness and what he called the “unborn changeless
ground” to be the same. Though this is permissible
in a Mahāyāna context (and in fact Ju Mipham’s use
of the term emptiness in that context is not at odds
with the concept of ground), changeless ground seems
to be Wilber’s term for Dzogchen-qua-Base, which is
not emptiness, for the latter (in a specific sense of the
term) is no more than one of its aspects (in the twofold
classification, it is its primordial purity aspect (Tib.
katak [ka dag]), which in the threefold classification
corresponds to the essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect,
and which is the aspect that somehow may be said to
be changeless—the other aspect being its spontaneous
perfection (Tib. lhundrub [lhun grub]), which subdivides
into the nature (Tib. rangzhin [rang bzhin]) and energy
(Tib. thukjé [thugs rje]) aspects. Moreover, Tsongkhapa
rejected the concept of a Base, and therefore his ultraorthodox followers (which is surely how the controversial
character Wilber gave as his source for his last four fulcra
sees himself) would wholeheartedly reject it as well.
Therefore, Wilber is clearly at odds with his
main sources—including both the Dzogchen teachings
and the controversial Tibetan character. In fact,
Wilber’s emptiness is in tune with the Daoist concept of
nothingness (Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, wú; Wade-Giles wu;
Jap. mu) and the Chán / Zen concept of the Great Void
(Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, dàwù; Wade-Giles, ta-wu). This
concept seems to roughly correspond to the one expressed
by the Skt. mahāśūnya (Tib. tongpa chenpo [stong pa chen
po]), as well as to that of the dharmadhātu (Tib. chöjing
[chos dbyings] or chökyijing [chos kyi dbyings])—which,
however, in Chinese is (Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn) fajiè or (WadeGiles) fa-chieh—which are anathema to Tsongkhapa
and hence must be so to Wilber’s source as well—and
to some extent with the primordial purity (Tib. katak [ka
dag]) or essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect of the Base
in the Dzogchen teachings,27 which, as noted above,
Tsongkhapa rejected (note that the Dzogchen teachings
compare the Base’s essence aspect to the no-thing-ness of
a mirror in the sense of being that which allows awareness
to fill itself with appearances and nonetheless continue
to [be] no-thing-ness—which for its part implies that
phenomena that manifest in this way are empty of selfexistence). The point here is that if one disagrees with
an author as to what the ultimate truth is and how it
manifests, it is absurd to take him or her as an authority
with regard to the way realization develops, for there is
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the signifier Ayin or Emptiness has a real referent
as disclosed by injunctive paradigm. That is, those
who are qualified to make the judgment agree that it
can be said that, among other things, Spirit is a vast
infinite Abyss or Emptiness [experienced through
first-person perspective in a causal state],26 out of
which all things arise. (p. 268)

no reason to assume that realization and its imitation—
or two different kinds of realization, for that matter—
must develop in the same way. Moreover, Wilber did
not even follow his source faithfully, for as he quoted
from the latter, he added his own terms within brackets,
seemingly in order to twist the controversial author’s
assertions in order to make them fit his own views.28
Abramson (2010) went on with his attempts to
vindicate Wilber:
While Capriles correctly pointed out that the
nirmanakaya, the sambhogakaya, and the dharmakaya do not fit Wilber’s model, it is interesting to note
that Wilber’s definition of the Subtle and Causal levels
provide a possible explanation for this being so. For
example, in Capriles’ critique of Wilber’s inclusion
of nirmanakaya in his psychic (i.e., lower subtle)
level, Capriles implied that while nirmanakaya may
manifest in the gross level (which Wilber’s psychic
level relates to), it is also of the nondual level in the
sense it is Buddha’s body. Similarly this applies to
the sambhogakaya, and the dharmakaya. Cosmic
consciousness is another example of a spiritual state
that Wilber asserts to be in his psychic level, but
does not, for the same reason as above, appear to fit
there. This can be deduced from Daniels’ (2005, pp.
200-202) discussion of its apparent misfit where he
pointed out that, although cosmic consciousness may
manifest in the psychic level in the sense that it relates
only to gross phenomena and not to the subtle or
causal domains, it is otherwise indistinguishable from
“One Taste” or “Ultimate” nondual consciousness
which is of the nondual. Thus Capriles’ objection to
Wilber’s ascribing nirmanakaya, sambhogakaya, and
dharmakaya to the psychic, subtle, and causal realms
respectively can be reframed as a critique of the
inherent limitations of Wilber’s definition of these
levels. But equally, Wilber might claim that most
of the spiritual states that he asserts belong to these
realms are correctly placed because they do relate to
his definitions of those realms; in other words, the
above examples appear to be the limited exception.
(p. 184)
The above reduces my denunciation of the
mismatch between Wilber’s last four fulcra and that
which the Anuttarayogatantra sees as the four kāyas to
its most insignificant aspect, for it overlooks the major,
radical mismatches denounced in my exhaustive and
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long critique of these fulcra—a few of which were
reviewed in point (1) above in this reply—and reduces
the denunciation in question to its least significant and
striking aspect, namely that “while nirmanakaya may
manifest in the gross level (which Wilber’s psychic level
relates to), it is also of the nondual level in the sense it is
Buddha’s body, [and] this applies to the sambhogakāya,
and the dharmakāya.” As to whether or not Wilber
faithfully follows the most controversial character he
takes as the source for the last four fulcra in Wilber IV and
the last four stages of the line of cognitive development
in Wilber V (including those reproduced in Abramson,
2010), I decided to abstain from determining, as this
would require me to read the books by the character in
question—which I will not waste my time in doing, and
which I do not advise others to do.29
Wilber has also continued to maintain the
supposed equivalence between the “three great states
of consciousness” which are waking, dreaming, and
dreamless sleep, and the “three great realms of being”
he has posited, which are gross, subtle, and causal—a
thesis that I refuted in a most clear way in the last two
Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2006, 2009)—and
in general he has continued to overlook the crucial
difference between the samsaric formless realms, the
neutral condition of the base-of-all, and the nonstatic
nirvān. a of higher Buddhist vehicles (which he does
not even refer to in his writings, for he always reduced
nirvān. a to the Therevadan nirodhasamāpatti and still
continues to do so), which throughout the three Beyond
Mind papers was said to be the most basic and blatant
omission, not only of Wilber’s system, but of the whole
of transpersonal and so-called integral theory.
Because of all of the above, Wilber readers
who take him seriously are bound to mistake samsaric
experiences for nirvanic levels of realization, and
therefore be unable to proceed on any Buddhist Path.
Consider Abramson’s (2010) explanation of Wilber V’s
view in these regards:
Wilber’s explanation for being able to access any state
from any stage of development starts with pointing
out, “… the three great states of consciousness
(waking, dreaming, sleeping) are said to correspond
with the three great realms of being (gross, subtle,
causal) … an idea found in … Vajrayana” (Wilber,
2002a, p. 1). According to Wilber, different worlds
i.e. the three realms of gross, subtle and causal are
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disclosed by different states of consciousness, and
any different state of consciousness is potentially
available at any time and to anyone at any stage of
their development, because all humans have access
to the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states. But,
Wilber explains “stages CANNOT be skipped,
because each stage is a component of its successor
(this would be like going from atoms to cells and
skipping molecules)” (ibid). Going from first person
perspective (magical/typhonic stage) to second person
perspective (mythic stage) to third person (rational
stage) is a process of development where, according
to Wilber and supported by researchers such as Jane
Loevinger, Robert Kegan and Susanne Cook-Greuter,
stages cannot be skipped. (Italics my own)
Moreover, the above passage demonstrates the
fact, repeatedly referred to here, that Wilber is still positing
a very rigid schema of hierarchical structures of the kind
denounced throughout the Beyond Mind papers, for he
has continued to affirm that stages cannot be skipped,
precisely because each stage is a component of its successor—
which he compared with going from atoms to cells while
skipping molecules. Since the structure of each of the stages
is arisen and produced (as all structures necessarily are), as
noted in the discussion of Wilber’s last four fulcra in the
last two Beyond Mind papers—and no matter how many
times he may echo the Dzogchen teachings’ assertion
that Buddhahood, rather than a creation, production, or
construction, is the direct, bare recognition of an already
perfectly present condition—in Buddhist terms his last
four fulcra or stages are produced / contrived / conditioned
.
/ compounded / fabricated (Skt. samskr.ta; Pāli: sankhata;
Tib. düje [’ dus byas]), and as such are impermanent and
pertain to samsāra. As to Dzogchen in particular, there
is no need to repeat here all of the quotations offered in
those papers to demonstrate that on the Dzogchen Path
there is no given sequence of realization (including the
one from a Richö by Dudjom Rinpoche and the one from
the Tantra of the Upadeśavarga or Menngagde [Tib. man
ngag (gyi) sde] series of teachings called The Heart Mirror
of Vajrasattva [Tib. Dorje Sempa Nyinggi Melong (rdo rje
sems dpa’ snying gi me long)], or the examples given that
show realization not to depend on maturity—i.e., on
developing structures—and hence Wilber to be wrong in
this regard (including that of Urgyen Tulku’s teacher and
the more striking one of Namchö Mingyur Dorje [nam
chos mi ’gyur rdo rje]).
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Abramson noted that Wilber V relinquished the
whole idea of an independently existing Great Chain
of Being involving different, self-existing planes of
existence, as well as that of eternal or timeless structures
of human consciousness.30 However, he has continued
to posit a correspondence among the rungs in various
lines, which seems to imply that he views them as stages
in an overall, integral type of development—and, what
is far worse, he has now presented this development as a
transition from lower to higher focal points (cakra) that
he associates to different colors in a schema that, as M.
Alan Kazlev (n.d.) notes, is not found in any traditional
system. Kazlev (n.d.) wrote:
[The schema in question] is not much more than
about thirty years old; the earliest reference I know
of is Christopher Hills’ (1977) Nuclear Evolution;
an elaborate Integral theory that predates Wilber’s
AQAL by several decades… . Hills’ book seems to
have had little or no influence on the wider world,
so Wilber’s rainbow chakras are probably based on
pop-Osho New Age websites. (n.p.)
Abramson (2010) also noted that Wilber V no
longer claims that higher spiritual levels can only be
steadily attained and gone through after a considerable
progress has been reached along different lines of
development, or that it is impossible to “jump” from
a low to a high spiritual level. In fact, he made the
point that by 2006 Wilber had embraced the WilberCombs lattice according to which in our present age31
people can “advance” to any spiritual state at any stage
of development—thus implicitly disavowing the just
mentioned theses. Abramson (2010) cited Wilber (in
Wilber & Cohen, 2005, p. 3):
If people get the evolutionary unfolding, they usually
haven’t had that experience of prior emptiness or of
the unborn or the changeless ground. And because
of that, they tie their realization to an evolutionary
stage. “I have to be at this stage; then I can realize.”
And that’s not it at all, because that ever-present state
is ever present, and you can have that realization
virtually at any point. But in order to stabilize and
ground it, you do indeed have to then grow and
develop. So they just understand the evolutionary
side of form, and the other folks tend to have the
emptiness understood, but very rarely do you get
emptiness together with evolutionary form.

Capriles

The phrase, of prior emptiness or of the unborn or the
changeless ground was discussed above, where it was noted
that Wilber’s controversial Tibetan source would not
accept an identity between emptiness, the unborn, Ayin,
a vast infinite Abyss, and that which Wilber imprecisely
calls the changeless ground, or Wilber’s assertion that it
is out of emptiness that all things arise (to begin with,
as noted above, emptiness for Tsongkhapa consisted
in the presence of the absence of inherent / hypostatic
/ true existence, and mere absences simply cannot bear
anything; likewise, he would not accept the concept
Wilber expressed by the phrase changeless ground; etc.; cf.
the discussion of some of the meanings of emptiness in
the corresponding endnote [endnote 22]). As to Wilber’s
assertion in the cited passage that in order to stabilize and
ground realization one has to then grow and develop, it
implies that child prodigies like Namchö Mingyur Dorje
in a matter of months, or at most a few years, should have
grown and developed along the various Wilberian lines of
development as much as a normal individual does over
many years. Above it was noted that in any individual
who nongradually attains a genuine spiritual realization
of higher Buddhism, selfishly-motivated actions
gradually diminish while selfless activity for the sake
of others increases; the psyche gradually gains in selfconsistency; the propensities for evil, self-encumbering
and so on are gradually neutralized, and so on—yet
none of this implies that in all Wilberian quadrants the
individual rapidly progresses through the stages Wilber
has posited, or that child-prodigies like Mingyur Dorje
will not retain any infantile traits in any Wilberian
quadrant.
As noted above, the newer Wilber admits there
may be a somewhat freer transit between lower and
higher levels in ontogeny as well as phylogenesis, and
that development along one line of development does not
need to strictly depend on development along the other
lines. As Abramson (2010) put it:

Kelly [1998], but also from Taylor [2003, 2005] and
many others). In fact, Wilber’s view on the phylogenetic
evolution of both the psyche and society has shifted to a
rather here-now perspective based on Rupert Sheldrake’s
(1981) theories of morphogenetic fields and formative
causation, which he formerly rejected—yet to a certain
degree he continues to establish a parallel (which is now
far looser) between ontogeny and phylogenesis. What is
worse, he recently introduced a new evolutionary concept
that is not present in any traditional spiritual system
whatsoever—namely that a fully Awake individual in
previous stages of human evolution would not be fully
Awake today. His argument is as follows:
The same structure that 6000 years ago could be
said to be fully Enlightened, is no longer so today.
Somebody at mythic-membership today is no
longer one with the Totality of all Form, because
there are “over the head” of amber, the orange and
green and teal and turquoise structures. Those are
now real, “ontological,” actually existing structures in
the Kosmos, as real as if they were Platonic eternal
givens (except that they aren’t), and if a person has
not transcended and included those levels in their
own development, then there are major levels of
reality that they (the amber individuals) are not one
with. Even if they master nondual states of a perfect
nondual union of Emptiness and Form, even if they
master Ati Yoga and thögal (i.e., thögel [thod rgal])
visions and the 5 ranks of Tozan, even if they master
centering prayer and the deepest contemplative
states, even if they rest constantly in Ayin, they are
not fully Enlightened: there are aspects of Form that
never enter this person’s world, and thus—exactly
as we were meant to explain—this person’s satori is
oneness with a partial world. (Wilber, 2007, p. 247)

This is an important development, which
probably resulted from the huge amount of criticism
his phylogenetic views have received (not only from

The fact that Wilber here mixes up the transient
freedom from conditioning Japanese Zen calls satori
(Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, wù; Wade-Giles wu) with Full
Awakening (Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, pútí; Chin. WadeGiles, p’u-t’ i; Jap. bodai), which is an irreversible
condition, is irrelevant to the thread of the present
discussion. What is important is that the above is an
example of the extreme structural paradigm criticized
throughout the Beyond Mind papers as well as in the
upcoming book systematizing the arguments of those
papers, for Awakening, rather than a structure, is
absolute freedom from conditioning by structures, and
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The Wilber-Combs lattice separates states (e.g.,
psychic) and stages (e.g., typhonic-magical, mental
egoic) into different dimensions. The psychic state
is not therefore a higher structure of mental egoic,
typhonic or any other stage and consequently does
not incur the objection Kelly ascribes to it.

at any rate, even if one accepted the thesis that at each new
stage of the cognitive or spiritual evolution of the human
species new structures arise, Awakening would not consist
in including all structures arisen in human beings at a
particular time, as it lies in having come to See through
all that is arisen, into the absolute equality of the unborn in
which arisen structures are irrelevant—for one is no longer
conditioned by any such structure—and having come
to dwell irreversibly, uninterruptedly in this realization.
Although I am not against comparing Awakening as it
manifests in people of different ages whose psyches are
differently structured, this would by no means lead to the
conclusion that one who is Awake in a less structured age
will not be Awake in a more structured era just because
in the more structured epoch there are aspects of Form
that never enter her or his world. In fact, for someone who
is fully Awake today there will be aspects of Form that
never enter his or her world, such as forms manifesting in
other planets (whether in our solar system or in those solar
systems that have been recently discovered) that might be
discovered in the future: will he or she not be fully Awake
just because those aspects of Form do not enter her or his
world? Awakening consists, not in being one with the whole
of Form existing in one’s lifetime—even though it no doubt
involves nonduality with whatever manifests in experience
(including all that may have to do with the imagery
characteristic of the individual’s time), and freedom
from conditioning by it—but simply in being free from
the three types of avidyā listed in Dzogchen teachings.
Thus also this Wilberian thesis reveals his outlook to be
metaphenomenologically ascending and as such to be a case
of what Trungpa Rinpoche called spiritual materialism,
for it asserts Awakening to lie in embracing produced,
conditioned structures, rather than acknowledging it to
consist in the irreversible realization of the unproduced,
unconditioned absolute nature. Furthermore, there is no
reason to assume the existence of the structures Wilber
has posited—yet I do not intend to assess each of them in
order to accept it or reject it. (Note that those Buddhists
who take the concept of the omniscience of Buddhahood
literally would object that Buddhas are aware of whatever
happens in other planets, but on the other hand would
believe that Buddhas are aware of structures in the psyche
that would arise in humans in the future, and therefore
would claim that they integrate both the knowledge of
whatever happens in other planets and the structures
that will arise in humans of the future—thus discarding
Wilber’s thesis in this regard.)

It seems to me an outrageous expression of
modern hubris to believe that one who becomes Awake
today has a better or more complete realization than
one who became Awake 6000 years ago. Moreover, as it
follows from Carlson’s (n.d.), most valuable reflections,
in Wilber’s case this thesis—just as the rest of his rigid
evolutionary schema—seems to be motivated by a
pronounced right wing political stand. I was shocked and
surprised that Wilber (2007, p. 98), rather than trying
to guess what were the reasons that led the Dalai Lama
to make a certain statement that in all lights was made
from the standpoint of some specific others and in order
to respond to what he felt were their needs, and thus as
what Candrakīrti, and then Jayānanda, Gorampa and
others, called an “other-directed assertion” (i.e., without
himself adhering either to his own assertion or to an
alternative one; cf. the upcoming definitive editions of
Capriles, 2004, 2005), dared to assert the lofty spiritual
/ political leader to have an ethnocentric worldview,32 for
by so doing he implicitly placed himself in a spiritual
place above H.H.’s, from which he can accurately judge
him. I wonder whether this has to do with the fact that
the Dalai Lama’s political stance as an engaged Buddhist
(and even as a Marxist, as documented in the upcoming
book synthesizing the ideas expressed in the Beyond
Mind papers) conflicts with Wilber’s decidedly right
wing stance, or whether the latter was conditioned by
the anti-Dalai Lama drive orchestrated by the Tibetan
character he took as the source for his sequence of
realization (for understanding the reasons for this, cf.
Clifton with Miller, 1997, and Bultrini, 2008).33
The same characteristic modern hubris and his
right wing stance seem to be patent in Wilber’s claim
that true ecological awareness can only result from
attaining a “high stage of evolution” like the one that
in his view humans can finally attain in the current
time. As Abramson (2010) admited, Wilber (2007) has
continued to hold that:
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the comprehension of more complex aspects of
samsara will require correspondingly higher stages
of development e.g. the appreciation of ecosystems
will only “appear” to someone at a high enough (i.e.
post-conventional) stage of development. Thus only
people at post-conventional stage development will
be prone to make sacrifices to tackle the ecological
crisis because people at “lower” stages will not
recognise the problem.

Realization has nothing to do with making
sacrifices (whether in order to tackle the ecological crisis
or with any other purpose); what it does is to dissolve
the delusion (and hence the structures, perspectives,
and attitudes) at the root of ecological crisis, so that the
individual spontaneously, actionlessly works toward the
changes necessary for healing the ecosystem. In the same
way, as research by P. Descola (1986, 1996), cited in
some of the Beyond Mind papers and in the upcoming
book with the materials of these suggests, primal
human beings cared for the environment for hundreds
of thousands of years—at least until the time of the
earliest registered ecocides—without this involving a
sacrifice, for they seem to have neither objectified
the physical reality nor experienced it as inherently
alien to themselves, and to have been keenly aware of
interconnections—and therefore their spontaneous
responses to that reality improved biodiversity rather than
destroying it. My view is that the same would be the case
after the spiritual and social regeneration that I hope will
result from the completion of the reductio ad absurdum
of threefold avidyā achieved in ecological crisis. There is
no phylogenetic progress over the ages, just as ontogenic
development need not amount to betterment. Abramson
(2010) wrote:
Capriles points to the central premise of Wilber’s
theories of spiritual attainment i.e. they are based
on developmental steps leading to Nondual state of
Suchness, where some minimum level of attainment
of each development step must occur before one can
move to the next step. Capriles powerfully refutes
this throughout his three part “Beyond the Mind”34
work (that commenced publication in 2000 and
concluded in 2009). This refutation draws on the
doctrines of Dzogchen Buddhism according to which
true Awakening results only from the spontaneous
liberation of delusion. This spontaneous liberation,
Capriles explains, will manifest generally among
humans at the end of the current cycle of evolution
by the mechanism of reductio ad absurdum. Prior
to this the only mechanism for true Awakening is
an authentic spiritual path such as Dzogchen. The
spontaneous liberation of delusion which can manifest
in practitioners of an authentic path can occur at
any stage of development and Awakening, which can
follow repeated occurrences of spontaneous liberation
of delusion, can also occur at any stage of development.
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Remarkably, considering Wilber had held the
above view for at least two decades, by 2006 he
had admitted it was wrong and his current theories,
which make use of the Wilber-Combs lattice, imply
he is in agreement with Capriles insofar as people in
our present age35 can advance to any spiritual state at
any stage of their development.
Abramson implied that I claim that spontaneous
liberation will manifest generally among humans at the
end of the current cycle of evolution as a result of the
mechanism of reductio ad absurdum, without there
being a need for them to follow an authentic spiritual
path such as Dzogchen—which I have never claimed,
as to do so would amount to making a prophesy, which
is something I leave to those who consider themselves
prophets (if I had to bet, however, I would bet that
people would still need a Path in order to have access to
spontaneous liberation). What is worse, his words give
the impression that Wilber and I share the same view
on human evolution, when in truth he enthusiastically
adheres to the version of the myth of progress that
modern hubris (in this case in its right wing version) uses
to sustain its structured belief-system, whereas I espouse
the contrary, traditional view of social and spiritual
human evolution as gradual degeneration common
to Dzogchen and Tantric Buddhism, as well as to all
traditions having the teachings of Shenrab Miwoche
as their root.36 Likewise, Abramson (2010) seems to
assume that Wilber has a genuine ecological concern,
and implies that I share this concern with him. He wrote:
Capriles’ concern with ecological issues is clear:
The spiritual systems I practice and propound, as
all metaphenomenologically / metaexistentially
descending Paths, are perfectly nondual; yet …
[also] descending in … [the senses that]… they
have always been profoundly concerned with
ecological, social, economic, political, gender,
generational, cultural, and other related issues
(Capriles, 2009 pp. 7-8)
Wilber and I may coincide in claiming that at
some point humankind will have a relatively free, easy
access to the unconcealment of our true condition, yet he
apparently views this as an unprecedented occurrence,
whereas I regard it as the recovery of a capacity that
most likely was common to human beings of high
Antiquity—and my divergence from Wilber about the
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conditions that would make this possible and the time
at which it would become possible could hardly be more
pronounced. In fact, I claim that, due to the discrepancy
between the digital, secondary process code of the left
cerebral hemisphere, and the analog, primary process
code of the right cerebral hemisphere, the interaction of
the two cerebral hemispheres causes delusion to gradually
increase in the course of the time cycle, making it ever
more difficult for delusion to dissolve in Communion
and making its evil effects ever more pronounced, until
the point is reached at which it becomes evident that
the effects of human actions on the ecological, social,
psychological, and other planes are the opposite of
those that were intended, and hence that the actions in
question stem from delusion. By the time the ecological
crisis is near from reaching the point of no return—thus
showing human attempts to build a technological Eden
to have been based on the basic human delusion called
avidyā—psychological functioning in terms of delusion
has been impaired in the human species as a whole to
a considerable degree, and hence also on this plane the
empirical reductio ad absurdum of delusion has been
achieved—as a result of which an easier, freer access to
the state of Communion may be restored and hence the
structures and functioning that developed in the course
of degenerative evolution can repeatedly dissolve in
Dzogchen-qua-Path, thus gradually diluting themselves.
Now, since there is no guarantee that the chaos that the
exacerbation of delusion will produce in all fields, rather
than bringing about the extinction of our species, will
restore our access to the state of Communion and thus
bring about our regeneration, one must keep from turning
speculation into prophesy. The only thing known for
sure is that, given the current degree of disruption of the
global ecosystem, the disjunctive between regeneration
and destruction is presently being reached.
The Fukuyama of purportedly “ecological”
thinking (Wilber), on the contrary, has claimed that the
restoration of a freer, easier access of our species to the
unconcealment of our true condition, will occur when
our spiritual evolution makes us develop the “required
structures,” and that this will occur in the far future—
overlooking, in a seeming purposeful way,37 the fact that
if the radical, total transformation that is the condition
of possibility of human survival and of the beginning of
a new era of spirituality, wisdom, harmony, fulfillment,
and equality fails to occur in the very near future, in the
short term human society will disintegrate, we will face

unprecedented calamities and, most likely, our species
will put an end to its own existence. One may even come
to suspect the aim behind this aspect of Wilber’s system
to be simply that of forestalling the radical restructuring
of the economy, of the social and political order, and of
technology, which necessarily will have to be a central
aspect of the total transformation in question if the latter
will allow us to survive—not caring the slightest bit for
the fact that maintaining the status quo with its privilege
system and its overconsumption would ensure our selfannihilation. Has not the reader ever wondered why
Wilber charges so rabidly and furiously against so many
“green” authors and trends?
Unaware of all that has been written in
this section, immanentists could conclude that it is
praiseworthy that Wilber is trying to correct at least one
of his fundamental errors, by calling for a naturalistic
turn to religion and introducing the concept of intraphysical. Though I fully agree with the call in question,
in terms of my system (certainly not in those of Wilber’s
rigid, modern, progress-oriented view of our spiritual
and social evolution) this naturalistic turn would return
religion to what it was before the otherworldly turning
that gave birth to the gods (cf. Capriles, 2012), and as such
it would necessarily imply ceasing to posit a transcendent
reality—which, as shown above, Wilber has not done, for
he has continued to assert the existence of such reality,
by calling for “the transcendent” and the immanent to,
“in a sense, flavor each other.” (For a substantiation of
the fact that Buddhism has never posited a transcendent
reality, and that it outright categorizes those who do as
extremists, cf. Appendix I in Beyond Mind III [Capriles,
2009] and Volume III of the upcoming book [Capriles, in
press].) As to the concept of intra-physical, Frank Visser
(n.d.) has raised the following questions:
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Is intra-physical a physical concept? Then no
physicist would subscribe to that notion. Or is it
metaphysical? Then what’s the point of calling all
this “post-metaphysical”? Isn’t all science supposed to
be “post-metaphysical”? So what’s the big deal then?
And if he introduces the notion of “intra-physical”,
that surely introduces ontology in its wake? For
Wilber, “post-metaphysical” primarily seems to refer
to “evidence-based,” compared to speculative. If
that’s the case, it’s an unfortunate label for a view
that explores other experiential avenues than the
bodily senses alone.

Does the End of Metaphysics
Amount to the Eradication of Ontology
or Does it Call for Latter’s Transformation
into a Metaontology?
he last important feature of Wilber V to be discussed
here will be his own characterization of his current
philosophical position. To begin with, he has claimed
to have gone beyond metaphysics by no longer asserting
anything to exist independently. However, as Magnus
Riisager (n.d.) noted, Wilber still asserts spiritual realities
to exist independently in the levels he has posited:

T

Wilber wishes to hold on to the hierarchy (or
holarchy) of developmental levels (structure-stages).
As Wilber presents it, we are not just dealing with
an arrangement of levels according to how including
they are. Wilber assumes that the things and occasions
found on the more including levels are more real than
the things and occasions found on the less including
levels. This becomes obvious when Wilber talks about
the spiritual realities found on different levels:
The problem is not that spiritual realities don’t
exist or are hard to prove; it’s that their earlier
forms exist on lower levels and hence are not as
real as some of the later levels, but those higher
levels have their own spiritual realities” (ibid., p.
266—my emphasis).
So Wilber apparently operates with a nonrelative measure (of realness) in the Kosmos that is
not pre-given.
Riisager (n.d.) also noted that:
Wilber appears to believe that Spirit—in one form
or another—will be found (i.e. will exist) on all
(not yet evolved) levels; in other words, he doesn’t
question the presence of Spirit but only the “look” of
Spirit (cf. Wilber, 2003, note 26). In addition to this,
Wilber postulates the absolute existence of Eros and
Agape (Wilber 2006, p. 236, note *).
So Wilber’s unavoidable metaphysics includes:
The hierarchy (holarchy) of structure-stages
(i.e. a measure of realness),
Spirit,
Eros,
Agape,
A morphogenetic gradient in the manifest realm;
a morphogenetic field of potentials, and
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Certain prototypical (“archetypical”) forms
or patterns (e.g. mathematical-physical laws) (cf.
Wilber 2003, note 26).
In order to place the discussion in context
and then introduce the final bone of contention in
this assessment of Wilber V, let me briefly review the
interaction among metaphysical and anti-metaphysical
trends since René Descartes. The French philosopher
elaborated his metaphysics in reaction to the objections
to the purported certainty of knowledge raised by the
modern skeptics, and in particular by the nouveaux
pyrrhoniens (New Pyrrhonics; Popkin, 1979), which
challenged his religious and metaphysical certainties—
possibly to the point of making him experience
ontological anxiety and even panic—and which could
undermine the project, so dear to him, of achieving
technological dominion over the universe through the
development of science and technology (Capriles, 1994).
His strategy for trying to make his metaphysics immune
to skeptic criticism lay in applying the skeptic procedure
of methodic doubt, not for achieving the skeptic aim
of realizing it was not even possible to know whether
or not it was possible to know, but in order to find an
objective truth that could not be doubted—which he
wrongly believed to have found in the intuition of what
he called the cogito, even though the latter is no more
than an illusion produced by the delusory valuationabsolutization of the threefold thought structure and
one of the poles of the structure that is the second aspect
of avidyā in the division favored by Longchenpa (for a
full explanation of the three aspects of avidyā in both
the classification I privileged in the Beyond Mind papers
and the one Longchenpa and most Dzogchen Masters
privileged, cf. the Introduction to Vol. I of Capriles [in
press] and notes 55 and 99 to Capriles [2006], among
several other works). The French metaphysician then
unwarrantedly asserted the phenomenon in question
to be a God-created, nonspatial substance—and, since
the intuition of the cogito could not found the world’s
external existence, he had to breach the core principle of
the method he had assumed, and resort to the Christian
God to found it.38
Among the resurgences of skepticism after
Descartes, an important place is to be allotted to Scottish
moderate skeptic David Hume, who deconstructed
central categories of Continental metaphysics such as
substance—one of his essential contributions being the
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deconstruction of the mind’s purported substantiality—
and causality, among others. Kant claimed that his
reading of Hume had shaken his convictions, “awakening
him from his dogmatic dream” and leading him to
rethink his philosophy on the whole so as to produce a
totally new system. Though this is partly true, for Kant
was obliged to rethink much of what he had taken for
granted, what was mainly shaken by the reading in
question seems to have been his naïve substantiation of his
metaphysical convictions (provided these were really his
convictions39), for he seems to have kept the most essential
ones among them—such as the belief in the Christian
God, in a substantial mind and in substance in general,
in objective beauty and goodness, in the possibility of
a correct knowledge of most parcels of reality, and so
forth—which he substantiated by positing a prioris in
all the compartments into which he divided the psyche,
and claiming that the existence of these a prioris implied
the objective, true existence of a substantial mind and of
substance in general, and of objective truth, beauty and
moral law. Thus what Kant’s reading of Hume actually
did was to force him to express his dogmatic metaphysics
in a new way, so as to give the false impression that he was
respecting the limits of knowledge and producing a nondogmatic system (for an explanation of how he breached
the limits in question, cf. Capriles, 1994, 2007a Vol. I).
The widespread realization of Kant’s failure in his
purported attempt to produce a metaphysics that would
respect the limits inherent in knowledge, thus avoiding
dogmatism, is at the root of the characteristically modern
project of positivism, the best-known forms of which
intended to surpass metaphysics (and even ontology and
all that has traditionally gone under the label philosophy),
by keeping to supposedly verifiable evidence of the kind
the positive sciences deem admissible. In fact, among
the different forms of positivism, August Compte’s
claimed that ontology and the rest of what traditionally
went under the label philosophy had to be replaced by
an encyclopædia of the positive sciences; much later, at
the turn of the twentieth century, the Austrian empiriocriticists produced a science-based critical philosophy that,
like the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (which
was intended to surpass, by the same token, the whole of
the classic dualisms of metaphysics, and substantialistic
monism), involved an ontology free from the mind-matter
dualism; time after that, the neopositivists, including
those in the Vienna Circle, circumscribed philosophy
to a critical philosophy of science, thus turning it into

a servant and handmaiden of science; some trends of
philosophy of language (not Ludwig Wittgenstein’s final
system, as it asserted language not to match reality and
to be a source of delusion40) circumscribed the ambit of
philosophy to determining whether or not statements are
meaningful, and so forth.
Since, unfortunately, most trends within
positivism kept the belief in science as the bearer of
truth—a trend that reached a paroxysm when philosophy
was reduced to a servant of the sciences—in the current
era all forms of positivism are widely seen as obsolete
remnants of the enthusiasm with science proper to early
modernity. In particular, even though most of those
philosophers who define themselves as postmodern
continue to implicitly uphold the myth of progress that is
the root and essence of modernity, as a rule they outright
negate that science and philosophy discover truths or that
the discourses they produce can achieve an adæquatio rei
et intellectus (i.e., a concordance of human knowledge
with a purportedly independent, factic reality). In
fact, this idea runs counter, not only to those trends of
philosophy that categorize themselves as postmodern,
but in general to the views of a long list of philosophers,
scientists, and philosopher-scientists, and that goes at
least as back as the Greek Skeptics. (A quite interesting
case is that of Wilfred Sellars [1997, 1963], who absorbed
and amalgamated elements of British and American
analytic philosophy and Austrian and German logical
positivism, as well as of American Pragmatism—and, in
at least one work [1968], even of Kant’s transcendental
idealism—and became renowned for having questioned
the foundationalist belief in a given that may serve as the
basis for an adæquatio intellectus et rei.)
It was noted that Kant claimed that the Scottish
critical empiricist, David Hume, had awakened him
from what he called his “dogmatic dream.” Among
Hume’s alleged discoveries, most relevant at this point
is the universally accepted objection to empirical science
as the source of “scientific laws,” which nowadays is
widely referred to as Hume’s law, and which may be
enunciated as follows: “one is not entitled to extrapolate
the regularities observed in a limited number of cases to
the totality of possible cases, thus making it into a law,
as one or more of the unobserved cases could contradict
the observed regularity.” Moreover, science claims that it
derives its purported laws from observation of objective
facts, the very existence of which, as noted above,
Sellars called into question. For their part, the scientists’
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observations are, as Bachelard made it clear (1957) and
as so many others have reiterated,41 utterly conditioned
by their expectations—and therefore by their ideologies
and wishful thinking. An anecdote told by Edgar Morin
(1981) clearly illustrates the extent to which observational
judgments are conditioned by ideology: while driving his
car into a crossroads, he saw another car’s driver disregard
the traffic light and, with his car’s front bumper, hit a
moped that was moving with the green light. Morin
stopped his car and stepped down in order to testify in
favor of the moped driver, yet when he did so he heard
the latter admit that it was him who overlooked the red
light and hit the car on the side. Incredulous, the famed
thinker examined the car, finding the dent the moped
made in the car to be on the latter’s side, and concluding
that his thirst for social justice and socialist ideology
caused him to perceive the event wrongly and invert the
facts, even though he had not drunk any alcohol and no
other conditions were present that could have distorted
his perception. In the case of an experiment planned
beforehand, the results are far more doubtful, for the
way in which the experiment is set up and the criteria in
terms of which the data it yields are assessed are arranged
to satisfy the researcher’s expectations, as he / she intends
to corroborate a theory put forward beforehand.
The above explains why such a conservative
thinker as Karl Popper (1961) noted that, if no experience
contradicts a theory, scientists are entitled to adopt it
provisionally as a probable truth (thus open-mindedly
acknowledging that no scientific theory can be fully
substantiated, yet closed-mindedly clinging to the belief
in truth qua adæquatio), and that the acceptance of a
new theory gives rise to as many problems as it solves.
Moreover, as it is well-known, on going through the
history of science, Thomas Kuhn (1970) noted that from
the moment a scientific theory or paradigm is accepted
as true, scientific observations begin to contradict it, yet
the scientists consistently overlook these contradictions
until the point is reached at which contradictions become
so abundant and conspicuous that they can no longer
ignore them, and hence they must set out to devise new
theories and paradigms in order to account for these
observations—yet new observations will contradict the
new theory or paradigm as well, and hence the process in
question will repeat itself again and again. In fact, in the
current era the belief that science discovers truths has been
demystified to such a degree, that Paul K. Feyerabend
(1982, 1984, 1987)—who has shown scientists to often

arrive at their discoveries and theories by breaking the
established procedural rules of science—placed Western
reason and science on the same plane as magic and sorcery.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche
(1999) had already left behind the above-discussed idea
that human interpretations often do not reflect facts, and
had gone so far as to claim that there are no facts that
may be or not be matched by those interpretations. In his
allegedly “postmodern” period, in which he propounded
the active radicalization of nihilism, Gianni Vattimo
(1995, p. 50) wrote in this regard:

All of the above shows that Georges Sorel
(1922, 1906, 1908) was right in claiming, between the
last years of the nineteenth century and the onset of the
twentieth century, that human beings act under the
influence of myths, that the sciences are myths, and that
the scientific pretensions of Marxism—a focus of his
criticism—responded to the force of the myth of science,
which prevailed in Marx’s time.42 It also suggests that
Antonio Gramsci (1998, p. 63)43 was equally right in
pointing out, in 1948, that to the extent to which one
takes the “discoveries” of the sciences as truths in the
sense of adæquatio of a scientific map to an interpreted
territory, the sciences are ideologies. The point is
that science and technology are indivisible from the
ideological project of modernity,44 which initially was
associated with the ascending bourgeoisie and at a later
stage, through the influence of Marxism, also with the
ascending proletariat: as Marcuse (1964) noted, science
is by its very nature instrumental, and hence it naturally
delivers the means for the domination of the natural
environment and other human beings (“From Negative
to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and
the Logic of Domination,” ch. 6 of Marcuse, 1964).45
Thus it is not difficult to see why Michel Foucault (1976,
1978) and Gilles Deleuze (1980)46 asserted philosophy
and science to be more than ideologies: for a very long
time philosophical systems, and for a shorter time
scientific disciplines and theories (according to Deleuze,
psychoanalysis played this role at the time he wrote
the book in question), have functioned as an “abstract
machine or generalized axiomatic” that works as the
matrix that makes possible the very existence of power—
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Nihilism means in Nietzsche “de-valorization of the
supreme values” and fabulation of the world: there
are no facts, only interpretations, and this is also an
interpretation.

their function being that of providing power with the
forms of knowledge necessary to sustain the models on
the basis of which it will have to structure itself in each
period.
As to the logic in terms of which the sciences
function, it is evident that from one standpoint a given
entity is that entity, yet from a different viewpoint
(belonging to a different logical type) it is not that
entity (e.g., from a certain standpoint a wooden table is
a table, but from other standpoints it is not a table but:
an assembly of pieces of wood; a conglomerate of atoms;
a piece, singled out for perception, of the continuum
that according to Einstein’s Field Theory the universe is;
etc.)—and that this may at first sight seem to contradict
Aristotelian logic (in particular, the conjunction of the
principle of the excluded middle and the principle of
noncontradiction that Peter Suber [1997] referred to as
Exclusive Disjunction for Contradictories [PEDC]). In
their noted Theory of Logical Types, Bertrand Russell
and A. N. Whitehead (1910-1913) seemingly intended
to solve apparent problems of this kind by asserting
contradictions between terms to be “real” only when both
terms belong to the same logical type, and hence requiring
that no element belonging to a logical type different
from that of the class being dealt with be included in the
class or excluded from it. However, the theory elaborated
by Russell and Whitehead was objected by Kurt Gödel
(1962), who pinpointed a major problem, not only of the
theory in question, but of all deductive systems—which,
after induction was shown to be nonexistent, has been
acknowledged to include all scientific systems—by
ideating his incompleteness theorem, which showed
all logical systems to necessarily contain at least one
premise that cannot be proven or verified without the
system contradicting itself … from which it follows that
it is impossible to establish the logical consistency of any
complex deductive system without assuming principles
of reasoning the internal consistency of which is as open
to questioning as the system itself. With a reasoning far
more accessible to the general reader, Gregory Bateson
(1972) noted that in order not to include or exclude items
that do not belong to the logical type being considered,
as the theory of logical types demanded, one had to
exclude all such items from consideration, which meant
that one was excluding them in order not to exclude
them and thus was violating the principle one was
intent on respecting. Moreover, this implies that, when
dealing with the class to which x belongs, whatever does

not belong to the same class as x cannot be considered
either as x or as non-x—which violates the principle of
Aristotelian logic the theory in question was intended
to save, for according to it whatever is not x is non-x.
Of course, if one regards the theory of logical types
as a mere convention necessary for resolving practical
problems, rather than as an attempt to substantiate the
supposedly ultimate character of Aristotelian logic, then
it will fulfill its purpose—and, at any rate, the problems
just discussed may be deemed irrelevant for the validity
or invalidity of the empirical sciences.
I would not deny that, in spite of Hume’s law
and the whole of the above objections, the sciences are
as a rule capable of predicting some types of events with a
considerable degree of reliability, as well as of producing
predictable immediate effects. However, in the long
run they produce effects that altogether contradict the
ones they claim to be intent on producing. In fact, as
I have noted elsewhere (Capriles, in press, 2007a, etc.),
in terms of Korzybski’s (1973) semantics, according to
which sanity is determined by the structural fit between
one’s reactions to the world and what is actually going
on in the world, and insanity by the lack of such fit,
it is necessary to conclude that Śākyamuni Buddha was
certainly right when he compared fully fledged avidyā
to an illness, and that Candrakīrti hit the mark when
he compared this fully fledged avidyā to insanity,47 for
it gives rise to a severe structural discrepancy between
human reactions to the world and what is actually going
on in the world: as stated again and again throughout
my works, human attempts to achieve satisfaction
yield dissatisfaction, efforts to suppress pain produce
pain, and efforts to (allegedly) destroy death and all
negative aspects of life and build a technological Eden
have originated the ecological crisis that is producing
major natural disasters and which threatens to disrupt
human society and even put an end to human existence
in the course of the present century. Thus it seems that
Korzybski was wrong when noting, in terms of the famed
map-territory analogy, that although the map is not the
territory, the map could be correct in the sense of having
a structure similar to that of the territory that allows one
to successfully deal with the latter—thus achieving the
structural fit defining sanity.
Korzybski’s criterion coincides with the one that,
in the face of Hume’s law and the accumulated objections
of subsequent epistemologists (cf. Capriles, 1994, 2007a
vol. III, 2007b), Alfred Julius Ayer (1981) devised with the
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aim of validating the sciences: the one according to which
“we are authorized to have faith in our procedure, so long
as it carries out its function, which is that of predicting
future experience and thus control our environment.”
However, in trying to control the environment with the
purported aim of creating an artificial Eden and kill
death and pain, the sciences and the technology based
on them, rather than achieving their declared effect,48
have produced a hellish chaos and taken humanity to
the brink of extinction—and, moreover, at no moment
did they foresee this outcome. Therefore Ayer’s criterion,
rather than validating, outright invalidates the sciences.
In fact, as already noted, the current ecological
crisis has made it evident that the technological
application of the sciences in the long run gives rise to
effects contrary to the ones they are allegedly intended to
produce. Thus to the extent to which the sciences involve
a pretension of truth in the sense of exact correspondence
of their maps to the territory of the given, or the pretension
of improving human lives and producing a technological
paradise, it is clear that they are metanarratives involving
the denial of their character as metanarratives, and as
such they must be denounced as being both myths and
ideologies: they are elements of modernity’s myth of
progress,49 which ecological crisis has proved, not merely
to be unrealizable, but to be outright deadly.50
The above discussion of the limits of science
makes it evident that the positivistic belief that
metaphysics will be surpassed and truth will be attained
by replacing philosophy with the positive sciences (etc.)
could hardly be more misguided. However, in the first
half of the twentieth century the initial attempts were
made to surpass metaphysics in a way radically different
from those proper to ordinary positivism—among which
at this point it is relevant to briefly refer to those made
by Edmund Husserl, who devised phenomenology in the
twentieth century sense of the term, and later on some
of the Continental philosophers that further developed
the discipline in question. Rather than trying to surpass
metaphysics by rejecting ontology, as ordinary positivism
had done, Husserl developed that which he referred to as
an absolute positivism, which rather than dealing with the
so-called “positive knowledge” produced by the sciences,
was concerned with essences relevant to ontology—his
intent being that of producing an ontology purportedly
based solely on what appears (universally accepted sense
of the Greek term phainomenon) in human experience,
which, he believed, as such would be free from unfounded

metaphysical theses. In this he was followed by the rest
of twentieth century phenomenologists, whose discipline
enjoyed the highest prestige for decades. However,
nowadays it is widely acknowledged that the discipline
in question fell short of its purported aim.
One of the noted philosophers whose
denunciation of this fact made the greatest impact was
Jacques Derrida (1967), who asserted phenomenology to
be no more than a [crypto]-metaphysics, while referring
to the phenomenological emphasis on the supposed
immediacy of experience as the “new transcendental
illusion.” I endorse Derrida’s assertion, except for one
detail, which I discuss in the note appended at the
end of this sentence.51 However, the reason why for me
phenomenology is a cryptometaphysics, and the belief
in the immediacy of experience an illusion springing
from an error analogous to the one that, according
to Kant, gave rise to the “transcendental illusion,” is
particular to my own perspective. The problem, for
me, is that basing ontology exclusively on that which
appears (phainomenon) in experience is no guarantee
that metaphysical constructs will not slip into it, for in
samsāra, to which human experience pertains, fullyfledged avidyā causes one to experience being as given,
unquestionable, ineradicable, and somehow absolute; to
experience the mental subject as being in its own right and
hence as a substance, and as being the thinker of thought,
the doer of action and the experiencer of experience; to
experience the essents one faces as being substantial in
Heidegger’s (1996) sense of making resistance to us and
so on, as being in their own right and thus as self-existent,
and as being in their own right this or that entity, and
so forth. Hence an ontology elaborated on the basis
of samsaric experience alone would not be really free
from metaphysical fictions, as it will most likely feature
at least some of the ones just mentioned (i.e., given,
inherent, somehow absolute being; a substantial cogito
inherently separate from the physical world and even
from the human individual’s experiences, thoughts and
acts, which thinks thoughts, carries out acts and receives
experiences; countless external, physical, substantial and
self-existent essents) and probably many other ones.
The above is what, as a rule, occurred with
twentieth century phenomenology. The most outstanding,
core phenomena of fully-fledged avidyā (or Heraclitean
lethe) that Edmund Husserl wrongly viewed as given,
ineradicable, self-existent substances, inadvertently
turning them into unfounded metaphysical foundations
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of his system, were the purportedly absolute Cartesian
cogito and the purportedly substantial noetic-noematic
(mental subject / object in human experience) schism that
is the condition of possibility of the cogito and the axis of
all dualistic, allegedly immediate yet actually mediated
samsaric experience. Martin Heidegger found Husserl’s
departure from metaphysics insufficient and set out to
carry it as far as he deemed it necessary, whereas JeanPaul Sartre and others of those who received Heidegger’s
influence set out to go beyond Heidegger—yet both
Heidegger and Sartre, like the bulk of phenomenologists
of the last century, failed to go beyond metaphysics,
for both of them failed to realize that samsaric human
beings are completely deluded, and that the phenomenon
of being that pervades human experience is no more than
a deceptive appearance manifesting in experience that
constitutes a pivotal aspect of human delusion, and thus
continued to take being to be given, somehow absolute,
unquestionable and ineradicable.
Heidegger, in particular—as I have shown
in depth elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a Vol. I)—wholly
misunderstood Heraclitus’ concepts of lethe and aletheia,
reducing the dialectics between the respective conditions
to such a shallow level as to make it insignificant
(Capriles, 2007a Vol. I52). In the same way, under the spell
of delusion, he overlooked the fact that the true nature
of reality, since it cannot be included in a class wider
than itself and does not exclude anything, has neither
proximate genus nor specific difference (genus proximum
/ differentia specifica), and hence cannot be contained
in any concept, including those of being (which, as he
himself acknowledged in the Introduction to Being and
Time [Heidegger, 1996] by citing Pascal, has its specific
difference in the concept of nonbeing), nonbeing (which
has its specific difference in the concept of being),
both and neither (the latter two, beside being positions
excluded by logic, being mutually exclusive). Although
he rightly identified being with the phenomenon of being
pervading the whole of the experience that twentieth
century phenomenologists deemed immediate but that
is actually mediated, he failed to realize the phenomenon
in question to be one of the most basic erroneous
appearances of the basic human delusion, and taking it
to be given and true, he went as far as to make the logical
mistake of identifying it with the arche or true nature of
reality.53
For his part, Sartre (1980) seemed to have
mistakenly, metaphysically assumed that there was

a given, absolute being distinct from the phenomenon
of being,54 and (like Husserl) that the subject-object
duality that manifests in human experience—as well
as the duality of their respective modes of being—
was ineradicable. However, in spite of this, and of
Derrida’s charges that in his interpretation and usage of
Heidegger’s concepts he incurred in a psychologism as
well as in an anthropocentrism, the French existentialist
had invaluable insights that can greatly contribute to the
philosophy these times require. Among other things, he
clearly showed the cogito not to be a substance (as I
have shown elsewhere,55 by the same token providing
the tools for elucidating Dignāga’s important concept
of svasamvitti / svasamvedana / rangrig (rang rig) /
awareness [of] consciousness, and determining how
does it relate to the Dzogchen usage of rangrig /
svasamvedana); he asserted human existence to be
drawn toward the holon—a term that he used in a sense
radically different from Koestler’s (1967; Koestler &
Smythies, 1970), and that he explained in a way that
allows one to identify it with Awakening—as telos,56
asserting all human actions and so on to be carried out
in the hope of achieving the qualities of the condition
in question (which, however, he deemed it impossible to
attain);57 and he deconstructed the pseudo-unity of the
Dasein, revealing its constitutive elements and the way
they interact, in a way that may be most profitable to
Buddhist practitioners, and in particular to those who
practice Dzogchen. (For an in-depth discussion of all of
this cf. Capriles, 2007a Vol. I.)
The above exposed the pretense of twentieth
century phenomenology of having gone beyond
metaphysics for what it was. Wilber V carried his
pretences much farther than the phenomenology in
question, for beside pretending to have gone beyond
metaphysics—which as Riisager (n.d.) showed, he
simply has not—he pretends to have gone beyond
ontology—on which he, just like some of those who have
discussed him so far, seemingly under the spell of socalled postmodern thought, decidedly frowns. In fact,
after phenomenology’s abortive attempts to produce a
nonmetaphysical ontology, Jacques Derrida, claiming
to have found the sketching of an end of ontology in
Nietzsche, Lacan’s Freud and Levinas, undertook what he
deemed to be a destruction of metaphysics which, unlike
the one Heidegger pretended to have achieved, would be
genuine and thorough, and which would bring ontology
to an end and by the same token open a perspective in
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which that which he called différance58 would find a place.
He believed the way to achieve this to consist in doing
away with ontological elaborations and circumscribing
the task of philosophy to the deconstruction (the French
déconstruction translates Heiddeger’s use of Destruktion
and Abbau—in non-Derrida contexts, often rendered
in English as debuilding) of existing discourses—and
in particular of all totalizing metanarratives, which
had been a target of so-called postmodern thought ever
since Lyotard (1979) introduced this defective label.
However, in the first place, in Derrida’s writings one
finds significant ontological assertions, so that they may
be seen as outlining an ontology.59 Moreover, at any
rate, simply to do away with ontology would be of no
use, for as noted above, fully-fledged avidyā gives rise
to an experiential ontological confusion that consists
in perceiving all phenomena-that-are-in-the-process-ofbeing—that is, all essents (German, Seiende; French,
étants; etc.)—as being inherently, absolutely and in-theirown-right (i.e., without depending on anything else) the
essents one perceives them as being, and in experiencing the
being of essents as a given, somehow absolute reality—all
of which has terrible consequences, for not only is it at the
root of the duhkha that constitutes the First Noble Truth,
but its exacerbation, together with the intensification
of the figure-ground split that hampers appreciation
of interdependences, is the very root of ecological
destruction. Although this experiential ontological
confusion cannot be eradicated by intellectual means
alone, in the case of formally educated people, or of
people having an intellectual disposition, the capacity to
decidedly, unwaveringly undertake the practices necessary
for eradicating the confusion in question will depend on
understanding it beforehand to be a confusion rather
than the undistorted experience of the true condition of
reality, as it is ordinarily taken to be—for only thus can
some conviction be obtained that there can be a Path of
Liberation, at least to the point to which this is feasible
by merely intellectual means. This is the reason why
ontological investigation has been a key element in all
authentic forms of Buddhism, Taoism, Śaivism, Sūfīsm,
the original Kabbalah, and the other systems I deem
conducive to Awakening, and ineluctably must continue
to be so. (Contrariwise, evolutionary psychology has no
role on the Path—this being one of the many reasons
why I find Wilber’s writings so heavy: because he devotes
so much of his reflection to questions that are even more
distractive and irrelevant to Awakening than the fourteen

unconjecturable [avyākr.ta] questions [avyākr.tavastūni]
before which Śākyamuni Buddha remained silent60
[which will be briefly discussed in the upcoming book
rearranging the materials of the Beyond Mind papers
(Capriles, in press, Vol. III, Appendix I and its notes)].)
The above is one of the main reasons why in
various of my works (most thoroughly in Capriles,
2007a Vol. III, 2012, in press) I have asserted totalizing
metanarratives to be vital, though preliminary, aspects
of the spiritual therapy required for healing the human
mind, society and the ecosystem. However, in order to
play this role, they must be structured in such a way as
to fulfill the dual purpose of showing the baselessness
of the assumptions of common sense—including the
assumption that conceptual systems can precisely match
reality—and helping one develop the faith necessary
to, (1) set out to apply the practices that lead beyond
understanding in terms of thought, into the immediate,
direct, nonconceptual realization of the true condition
of ourselves and the whole of reality, and (2) set out to
work toward the technological, economic, political,
social, cultural—in one word, total—transformation
that would help heal the ecological crisis humans have
produced (which as noted repeatedly has put at stake the
very continuity of human society and even of human
existence) and achieve what Tibetan Lama Chögyam
Trungpa (1984) called “an enlightened society.” This
is why the value of metanarratives exhorting abolition
of the delusory valuation of words and concepts, and
showing how can this be achieved, depends on their
explicit acknowledgement that they are Aśvaghosian uses
of language arisen spontaneously from a perspective that
does not confuse the maps of words and concepts with the
territory—as such being comparable to fingers pointing
to the moon that one must not confuse with the satellite,
or to rafts for crossing to the other shore (that of nirvān.a)
to be left behind as one reaches it. Furthermore, in order
to fulfill their aim, they must make it clear that the task
they indicate cannot be fulfilled by playing word games
or by merely achieving an intellectual understanding
of reality, for it requires one to wholeheartedly devote
oneself to a spiritual practice of the kind discussed
in my works—which cannot be learned in books or
Internet courses, for it will work only if one receives its
transmission from a good, authentic Teacher holding a
true, genuine, uninterrupted lineage originating in the
source of the teachings, and set out to apply his or her
instructions for going beyond the intellect.
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Back to Derrida, a major drawback of his philosophy
is that, as David Loy (1987) noted, it deconstructs identity
and the pairs of opposites, yet fails to deconstruct that which
he called différance and which is for him the condition of
possibility of all differences—whereas Nāgārjuna, creator
of Mādhyamaka philosophy, as early as the beginning
of the Christian era, by the same token deconstructed
the basis of identity and difference, thus leaving no
ontological assumption or basis for ontological assumption
unchallenged. In fact, as shown elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a
Vol. I), the highest systems of Buddhist philosophy—which
are Mahāmādhyamaka and the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna
Mādhyamaka Prāsangika—and the Dzogchen teachings
are totally free from such metaphysical assumptions
and thus need not undergo either deconstruction or
reconstruction. As I see it, these systems are by the same
token antecedents and keys to the production of an ontology
free from the belief in the givenness of being and in all of the
metaphysical assumptions of phenomenology that would
perfectly respond to the needs of the current time. The latter
is that which I set out to elaborate in some of my works
(the most elaborate being Capriles, 2007a Vol. I) and which
I call metaphenomenology—which can only be achieved by
means of a method of inquiry that, rather than basing its
hermeneutics of experience exclusively on the phenomena
of samsāra, considers and privileges the metaphenomenon/a
of nirvān.a61 that shows all of the phenomena of sam
.   sāra
and derived, reified metaphysical assumptions to be baseless
illusions.
The metaphenomenology in question is also a
metaontology: an ontology that discerns the nature of
being and of the entities which are in the process of being
(essents), as well as of nonbeing and so on. Whereas Western
ontology so far has been based solely on the experience
founded on the phenomenon of being that is proper to
samsāra, what I refer to as metaontology is so called because
it is principally based on the nirvanic unconcealment of
the true condition of both oneself and the rest of reality,
in which the phenomenon of being has dissolved and thus
it has become evident that it was no more than a baseless
appearance pervading all experience conditioned by the
basic human delusion that, as the Mahāyāna version of
the Four Noble Truth makes it clear, constitutes the root
of suffering—and which, as I have explained in many
works (Capriles, 1986, 1994, 2007a Vol. III and minor
works), is the root of ecological crisis as well. Therefore,
rather than taking being to be given or to constitute the
true nature of reality, it denounces it—together with the

rest of the phenomena at the root of the assumptions
of metaphysics—as one of the most basic deceptive
appearances that issue from fully-fledged avidyā.
Moreover, the root and essence of modernity
is the myth of evolutionary progress, which, together
with many of the metaphysical illusions and mistaken
assumptions proper to mainstream Western philosophy,
continues to underlie a great deal of so-called
postmodern thought—including most works that have
attempted so-called “postmodern” reconstructions of
the deconstructed (many of which have done so on the
basis of a Heidegger-inspired hermeneutics). This is also
the case with Wilber V, who claimed to have produced
a post-metaphysical reconstruction of primordial
traditions that in his view can salvage the latter’s essence
while shedding their ontological baggage, yet continues
to be under the spell of the modern myth of progress and
of so many of his former metaphysical assumptions—
including otherwordly ones!
Furthermore, the task Wilber undertook
could hardly be more pointless and futile, for as shown
above, millennia ago both the higher forms of Buddhist
philosophy and the Dzogchen teachings deconstructed
whatever needed to be deconstructed—unlike Derrida,
including not only identity and difference, but the
condition of possibility of difference as well. If there
remained anything to do in our time, it would be to
express the viewless view of the systems of Buddhist
philosophy and the Buddhist Path in question in an
up-to-date, re-elaborated way, as a result of confronting
them with the concepts and views of Western philosophy
from its onset until our time—which is precisely what I
have attempted in so many of my works (for a thorough
exposition of what I call my metaphenomenological,
metaexistential metaontology, cf. Capriles [2007a Vol. I];
for an in-depth discussion of the blemishes of so-called
postmodern philosophy and a thorough explanation of
what I view as genuinely post-modern, cf. Vol. III of the
same work [Capriles, 2007a Vol. III] and my most recent
book in Spanish [Capriles, 2012]).
As to overly metaphysical spiritual traditions—
including Perennialism, which in contrast with the
above-refuted, wrong use of the term postmodern by a
rich philosophical fauna, Wilber now apparently views as
premodern—Visser (2003) deems it extremely doubtful
that the essence of the traditions in question will come
across in Wilber V’s version, which the author claims to
have freed of untenable teachings and categorizes as post-
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metaphysical. With regard to the same traditions, Visser
(2003) said as well that Wilber’s latest writings obliterate
the difference between (exoteric) standard mythical
religious beliefs, and their (esoteric) mystical or so-called
occult reformulations, making the point that the reasons
why modernity rejects most of the premodern heritage
must be carefully weighted—even though he views the
attempt to reframe perennialism into a form that is not
offensive to either modernity or postmodernity as an
interesting exercise.
Even though the fact that Wilber carried
out this radical reshaping of his system amounts to
acknowledging that he was altogether wrong in so much
of what he formerly asserted, in one of the Integral Life
Newsletters of the last months of 2010 he wrote that in
spite of it he has always been right! Since among the views
that have remained unchanged through the successive
Wilbers, some of the central ones are his view of our
phylogenetic spiritual and social evolution as betterment
and progress, and his view of our ontogenic development
as occurring along different lines in a rigid structural
schema where advancement along the various lines is
to a considerable extent interdependent—and, for the
last two decades, also his association of the four highest
levels to the four kāyas of higher Buddhist systems—it is
to be assumed that it is these views (which were shown
throughout the Beyond Mind papers, the upcoming
book systematizing their contents, and this reply, to be
altogether wrong) that have always been right. (A Buddha
is right even when he makes what scientists would see as
conventionally incorrect assertions, for He is free from
delusion and hence is error-free, and He makes those
assertions without believing them to be conventionally
true; however, Wilber is not a Buddha.)
Conclusion
s given to understand above, a thorough assessment
of Wilber V would require an altogether new work,
as its intent is so ambitious—yet it would be currently
impossible to produce it because the new system by Wilber
is in the process of being built (one of the few works
publicly published in what is presumably its definitive
form being Integral Spirituality [Wilber, 2007]). At the
time of writing this, the reader interested in exploring
Wilber V may consult Wilber (2001a, 2001b, 2002a,
2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2010), Wilber and
Cohen (2002, 2005), all the works cited in this section
and many of those posted in Visser’s Site, Integral World,
and Reynolds’ (n.d.) eulogy of Wilber.
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1.    The difficulty in buying foreign books in Venezuela stems from draconian foreign currency restrictions implemented by the Chavez government (each
Venezuelan citizen who applies for it, is allotted a
very small sum of foreign currency every year for
use with credit cards in Internet shopping) and the
fact that it is hard for University professors to buy
foreign books with black market foreign currency,
for the latter is extremely expensive, and since the
government has not adjusted salaries proportionally
to inflation, income has dwindled considerably in
real terms—and, at any rate, I am not aware of any
way to do Internet shopping with cash. As noted in
the regular text, even in the absence of this difficulty, I would not procure and read all Wilber works as
he publishes them, as his views are only relevant to
my writings on transpersonal theory and practice,
which is only one subject among the many I address
in my books.
I strongly doubt I will produce critiques of any
further turns in Wilber’s system, but if I did, it must
be taken for granted that I would not do so immediately after these new turns take place.

2. Visser (2003) is the author of Ken Wilber: Thought
as Passion. His Website’s Internet address is http://
www.integralworld.net
3. The name is the same as that of the author of Overdo$ed America, but I assume this to be no more
than a coincidence.
4. This refers to Wilber’s former claim that the world
came out from a supramundane source yet continues to be one with the latter.
5. If the term “form” (Skt. rūpa) were circumscribed
to the forms perceived through the five universally
acknowledged senses—thus including the so-called
material forms of tsel (rtsal) energy and the luminous, yet intangible forms of rölpa (rol pa) energy*
but not so phenomena of dang energy such as the
mental images involved in fantasy, imagination, visualization and so on, then it would no doubt be
necessary to exclude the latter. However, here I am
using the word form in the sense it has in common
English, which includes all sorts of configurations
and patterns—no matter whether or not they are
perceivable through the five universally acknowledged senses.
*In general the Dzogchen teachings do not assert
phenomena of rölpa energy to be perceived through
the eyes; however, here I must address the views of
contemporary science, according to which those visions, just like hallucinations (induced by whichever
means), are perceived through vibrations of the rods
and cones that are not “induced” by the impact of
light coming from outside the body.
6. The Pramān.avāda tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—assimilated by the Indian Svātantrika
Masters and, in Tibet, by nearly all Mādhyamikas—distinguishes between two types of negation:
(1) nonaffirming, nonimplicative or absolute negation (Skt. prasājyapratiseda; Tib. megag [med dgag]),
and (2) affirming, implicative or relative negation
(Skt. paryudāsapratrisedha; Tib. mayindag [ma yin
dgag]).
The negation that is categorized as nonaffirming, nonimplicative or absolute is said to be the one
that negates the object of negation without implying
anything else: it is defined as “a negative which is
such that the term expressing it does not suggest in
place of the negation of its own object of negation
another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of negation” (Hopkins, 1983, p. 723). This type
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Notes

of negation is often illustrated by statements such as
there are no flowers in the sky or there are no real
falling hairs (the second one applying to a person that
suffers from myodesopsia and confuses muscæ volitantis or floaters with falling hairs)—which, however,
are uncertain examples, for the first statement implies
the existence of the sky, the second implies that of
a perceiver and the world in general (for there can
be no experience of falling hairs without a perceiver,
hairs—even if these are not “actually falling”—and
the rest of relative phenomena of the world), and as a
rule the statements used to illustrate this kind of negation always imply the existence of something else.
On the other hand, affirming, implicative or relative negation is said to imply something else: it is
defined as “any negation of an object, quality, etc.
that implies the assertion of some other facts.” Common examples of this type of negation are statements
such as, “for the last thirty years the fat man Devadatta has not eaten during daytime,” which implies
that he has been eating during the night (as otherwise he would not be fat, and, moreover, unless he
were a Rasāyana yogi [Tib. chülen naljorpa (bcud len
rnal ’byor pa)], he would have died within months),
or “this man is not a Brahmin (Brāhman.a),” which
implies that he is empty of Brahminhood but not so
of manhood, and that he either belongs to another of the Hindu castes, or has no caste whatsoever
and thus is either a non-Indian, an Indian dalit or
“oppressed” (i.e., one of those that Brahmanism calls
“untouchable” and that Gandhi referred to by the
Rgveda-contradicting euphemism, harijan or “child
of god”), or an Indian ādivāsi (“primal inhabitant”:
an aboriginal with a tribal way of life).
Je Tsongkhapa viewed the apprehension
of what he deemed to be the ultimate truth as
it manifests in the Contemplation state of the
superior bodhisattva, as involving a nonimplicative,
nonaffirming or absolute negation—which, since
negation is conceptual and can be entertained in
secondary process only, or, in the terminology of
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s Pramān.avāda tradition,
as well as in that of the Dzogchen teachings, it is
a universal, abstract concept of an entity [resulting
from a mental synthesis] (Skt. arthasāmānya; Tib.
dönchi [don spyi]), amounted to positing as the
ultimate a conceptual experience (which by being
stabilized through pacifying meditation, so that no

coarse, discursive thoughts [i.e., what Dignāga and
the Dzogchen teachings call word sound patterns
resulting from mental syntheses that are audio
categories (Skt. śabdasāmānya; Tib. drachi: sgra
spyi)] arise, is made to pass for a nonconceptual
realization)—and asserted this type of negation to
be a distinguishing feature of Prāsangika. However,
Jamgön Mipham correctly asserted the reduction of
the ultimate truth to a negation of this kind to be a
special emphasis of the Svātantrika system (which,
moreover, and as stressed repeatedly, in this system
is asserted to give rise to the provisional, conceptual
ultimate that it refers to as categorized ultimate
[Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrangpai döndam
(rnam grangs pa’ i don dam)] and that it regards as a
provisional, conceptual appearance that nonetheless
may constitute a step on the way to the true absolute
truth—namely the uncategorized absolute [Skt.
aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrang mayinpai
döndam (rnam grangs ma yin pa’ i don dam)],
which is free of any conceptual fabrications [Skt.
nisprapañca; Tib. thödrel (spros bral)]). Furthermore,
Mipham made it clear that the negation involved is
not truly an absolute, nonimplicative, nonaffirming
one. In fact, since Tsongkhapa’s object of negation
was inherent / hypostatic existence, which is utterly
nonexistent—as such being like a hare’s horn—
and he required the purportedly merely existent
phenomenon on which the inherent / hypostatic
existence had been projected, to persist after the
wrong mode of existence projected on it dissolved,
the negation in question must imply the existence of
the purportedly “merely existent phenomenon” that
is the basis on which one projects the false mode
of existence that is negated, and hence must be an
implicative / affirming negation.
Mahāmādhyamaka and Uma Zhentongpa
(dbu ma gzhan stong pa; Skt. reconstruction,
paraśūnyatāvāda) use a negation in their discursive
explanations of voidness that is clearly of the
affirmative or implicative kind, for it negates all
that is not the dharmakāya, or Buddha-nature, or
dharmatā—i.e. the true condition of reality—while
leaving this condition unnegated: the dharmakāya
(of however one calls the absolute) is said to be
empty of substances other than itself. However,
negation, either of this or of another kind, certainly
does not take place in the Contemplation state of
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this school—even though Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen
may have failed to stress this fact. Paradoxically,
Tsongkhapa disqualified Dölpopa because of his use
of an affirming, implicative negation—which, as
shown above, is the type of negation he himself used,
even though he asserted it to be of the alternative
type!
The above is the reason why Gendün Chöphel
illustrated nonimplicative, nonaffirming, absolute
negation with the simultaneous negation of the
four extreme positions regarding being: because
such negation does not allow the mind to entertain,
hypostatize and reify any concept whatsoever, and
hence it may lead the reasoning / understanding
mind to collapse together with the whole of its
conceptual comprehension (cf. the upcoming,
enlarged, revised versions of a couple of works of
mine: Capriles, 2004, 2005 [the latter in Chöphel,
2005].)
Mipham also made it clear that the Prāsangika
absolute is not the result of a negation of any kind.
John Pettit (1999) wrote (terms in brackets my own
additions):
According to Mipham, [purportedly] absolute
negation is a suitable way to conceptualize the
absolute for beginners, but because it is still a
conceptual formula, it does not represent the
final significance of nonelaboration (Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. trödrel [spros bral]). It is a mere
nonsubstantiality (Tib. dngos med), as opposed
to substantial existence (Tib. ngos po). It corresponds to the analytical wisdom (Skt. prajñā;
Tib. sherab [shes rab]) of the post-meditative
state and is adequate to emptiness as an object of
... thought but not to the nonconceptual gnosis
of sublime equipoise (Skt. āryajñāna; Tib. phagpai yeshe [’phags pa’ i ye shes]).” (p. 109)
Moreover, the experience of voidness produced
by what Tsongkhapa viewed as an absolute
negation involves the illusion of substantiality, for
as Gendün Chöphel rightly noted, within sam
. s āra
all experiences involve the illusion in question—
and the apprehension of the subtle concept (i.e., the
universal, abstract concept of an entity that results
from a mental synthesis [Skt. arthasāmānya; Tib.
don spy]) of what Tsongkhapa called non-inherent
existence would be no exception to this rule. So

Reply to Abramson and Thoughts on Wilber V

what results from this is the illusion of a substantial
insubstantiality!
Above, reference was made to Mahāmādhyamaka, to Uma Zhentongpa, to the Tibetan
Master who used these terms to refer to his own
understanding of Mādhyamaka—Dölpopa Sherab
Gyaltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292-1361),
founder of the Jonangpa (jo nang pa) School—and
to the fact that they assert the absolute to be empty
of substances other than itself. However, readers who
are not familiar with the different interpretations of
Mādhyamaka probably failed to fully understand
their position.
On most occasions, this Master and school
explained the absolute (Skt. paramārtha; Tib.
döndam [don dam]) as a positivity—yet sometimes
they explained it as a negation of the implicative
kind. Although Dölpopa’s contribution to Buddhist
philosophy is immeasurable, as he helped unravel the
highest meaning of both Mādhyamaka and Third
and Second Promulgation canonical sources, the
fact that he alternatively explained the absolute as
a positivity and as a negation, amounted to positing
extreme views that fall short of the mark. Moreover,
he went so far as to assert the dharmakāya to be selfexistent, which is even more extreme, for as I have
noted elsewhere (Capriles, 2004; cf. the upcoming,
definitive version) in the context of putting forward
my own version of Mahāmādhyamaka, the
dharmakāya may not be legitimately said to be either
existent or nonexistent—and hence far less may it
legitimately be said to be self-existent or inherently
nonexistent. However, for all of this to be properly
understood, first of all the reasons why Dölpopa
occasionally explained the absolute as an implicative
negation must be made clear.
The Samdhinirmocanasūtra distinguishes three
so-called “natures”: (1) what it refers to as absolutely
true, abiding nature (Skt. parinispanna; Tib.
yongdrub [yongs grub]), which is the ultimate; (2)
what it calls dependent nature (Skt. paratantra; Tib.
zhenwang [gzhan dbang]), which is whatever arises
from causes and conditions other than itself (hence
its name), or arises without being able to remain by
its own power more than a moment, or is produced
from the seed (Skt. vāsanā; Tib. bagchag [bag chags])
that is its own respective internal latency, and which
is thus held to consist in the interdependent arising
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of both subject and its manifold objects; (3) what
it calls imputational nature (Skt. parikalpita; Tib.
kuntag [kun brtags]), which consists on the thoughtcontents one superimposes on phenomena of the
dependent nature, and which it holds to be the real
source of defilements because it is the perception
of sensory data as being inherently this or that that
activates the passions. (This classification is not
self-evident, for one questions how can there be an
interdependent arising of the different entities that
make up the dependent nature in the absence of
the superimposition of thought-contents on sensory
data.)
At any rate, the sūtra in question makes the
point that what it calls dependent nature is an
ultimate non-nature (paramārthanihsvabhāvatā; Tib.
döndampa ngowonyi [don dam pa ngo bo nyid med
pa]) in that it is not the ultimate. However, since the
absolutely true, abiding nature must be an agent of
purification on a Path, and the source of defilements
is said to be the nature it calls imputational nature,
which consists on the concepts one superimposes on
the dependent nature—for as noted above it is the
perception of sensory data as being inherently this or
that that activates the passions—various passages in
that sūtra reduce the absolutely true, abiding nature
to the mere lack of the imputational nature. In other
words, the absolutely true, abiding nature is reduced
to the fact that entities of the imputational nature
do not exist “by way of their own character” (Skt.
svabhāvalaksan.asiddhi; Tib. ranggi tsennyikyi drubpa
[rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa])—to which most
Gelugpas would add, “as the referents of a conceptual
consciousness.” To express it differently, it reduces
the absolutely true, abiding nature to the mere fact
that entities of the dependent nature are not what
one experiences them as being when an imputational
nature is projected on them. On the basis of this
fact, both the Cittamātrins and Je Tsongkhapa (the
latter, in his interpretation of Cittamātra), reduced
the absolutely true, abiding nature to a purported
nonaffirming, nonimplicative, absolute negation—
which Mādhyamika-Svātantrika-Yogācāras of the
Śāntaraksita-Kamalaśīla tradition, modifying the
object of the negation, posited as an ultimate, though
not so as the true and final absolute that they called
uncategorized absolute (Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha;
Tib. namdrang mayinpai döndam [rnam grangs ma

150 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

yin pa’ i don dam] and that was free of conceptual
fabrications [Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. thödrel (spros
bral)]): for them it was no more than a categorized
ultimate (Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrangpai
döndam [rnam grangs pa’ i don dam]) that they rightly
identified as a provisional, conceptual appearance,
which, nonetheless, in their view could be a step on
the way to the true absolute truth.
In the context of their own system, Cittamātrins
may as well posit a purported nonaffirming,
nonimplicative, absolute negation as the ultimate, but
it would be illegitimate—to say the least—to posit
a negation of the kind (even if it negated an object
slightly different from that of the Cittamātras) as the
absolute truth [Skt. paramārthasatya; Tib. döndam
denpa (don dam bdem pa)] of the Mādhyamaka
Prāsangika, which has been established by this
school to be utterly free of conceptual fabrications
[Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. thödrel (spros bral)]). And
nonetheless this was what Tsongkhapa did, for
throughout his writings he reduced the ultimate of
the Prāsangikas to the presence of an absence, while
bitterly criticizing the definition of the absolute as
free of conceptual fabrications. (For clarification
of these points with the exception of the last, cf.
Hopkins, 2002; for the last point, cf. the upcoming
definitive versions of Capriles, 2005, 2004.)
Back to Dölpopa, his conception of the
absolute as an implicative negation is indivisible
from his conception of the absolutely true, abiding
nature (Skt. parinispanna; Tib. yongdrub [yongs
grub]) posited by Third Promulgation Sūtras,
which is in stark contrast to both the Cittamātrins’
and Tsongkhapa’s. In fact, on the basis of
higher Third Promulgation canonical sources
(which include the Mahāparinirvān.asūtra, the
Mahābherīhārakaparivartasūtra, the Angulimālasūtra, Suvarn.aprabhāsasūtra, the Lankāvatārasūtra,
the Āryaśrīmālādevīsimhanādanāmamahqyanasūtra
and others), of Tantras (such as the Kālacakra)
tantra and the Hevajratantra) and of higher
Indian Mahāyāna texts (such as, e.g. Maitreya’s
Ratnagotravibhāga / Uttaratantraśāstra [Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra]) and so on, Dölpopa established
the ultimately abiding nature (Skt. parinis.panna or
parinispanna-laks.an.a; Tib. yongdrub [yongs grub]
or [chönyi] yongdrubkyi tsennyi [(chos nyid) yongs
grub kyi mtshan nyid]): (1) to be the dharmakāya
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or the Buddha-nature; (2) to be endowed with
Buddha-qualities; and (3)—citing a passage from
the Angulimālasūtra—to be empty not only of
the imaginary projections proper to the imaginary
nature (Skt. parikalpita or parikalpitalaks. an.a; Tib.
kuntag [kun brtags] or kuntagkyi tsennyi [kun brtags
kyi mtshan nyid])—which are the source of the
passions and which in terms of the Pramān.avāda
tradition are general configurations / general
collections of characteristics (Skt. sāmānyalaks. an.a;
Tib. chitsen [spyi mtshan])—but also of the relative
phenomena that constitute the other-produced
nature (Skt. paratantra or paratantralaks. an.a; Tib.
zhenwang [gzhan dbang] or zhenwangi tsennyi
[gzhan dbang gi mtshan nyid]), which in terms of
current, popular interpretations of the Pramān.avāda
of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are specifically
characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent
collections of characteristics (Skt. svalaks. an.a;
Tib. rangtsen [rang mtshan]). He wrote with regard
to the absolutely true, abiding nature which (is)
the Buddha-nature endowed with the qualities
of Buddhahood (in Hopkins, 2002, p. 286):
Of what is it devoid? It is devoid of whatever
is an imputational or an other-produced nature,
conventional forms and so on. (Hopkins, 2002,
p. 286)
It was on the basis of the indisputable fact that
all phenomena of both the dependent nature (Skt.
paratantra; Tib. zhenwang [gzhan dbang]) and the
imaginary nature (Skt. parikalpita; Tib. kuntag
[kun brtags]) are utterly natureless (Skt. asvabhāva /
svabhāvato nāstikam; Tib. ngowonyi machi panyi [ngo
bo nyid ma mchi pa nyid] / ngowonyi mepa [ngo bo
nyid med pa]), and that therefore the Buddha-nature
that is the absolutely true, abiding nature is free
from all possible substances other than itself, that
Dölpopa came to concede that it was legitimate to
identify the absolute (Skt. paramārtha; Tib. döndam
[don dam]) with emptiness—but only if emptiness
were understood as the total absence of substances
other than the absolutely true, abiding nature (Skt.
parinispanna; Tib. yongdrub [yongs grub]) which
is the Buddha-nature endowed with the qualities
of Buddhahood, and hence if emptiness were
understood as an implicative negation excluding
both the dependent and imaginary natures, yet
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maintaining the absolutely true, abiding nature.
I fully agree that the absolutely true, abiding
nature (Skt. parinis.panna; Tib. yongdrub [yongs
grub]) is the Buddha-nature endowed with the
qualities of Buddhahood, and that this nature is
free from purported (yet nonexistent) substances of
both the dependent and the imaginary natures, and
hence from all possible substances other than itself—
and that therefore Cittamātrins were wrong in
concluding, on the basis of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra
alone, that whereas phenomena of the imaginary
nature are natureless, the same is not the case
with phenomena of the dependent nature—thus
mistakenly implying the absolutely true, abiding
nature not to be empty of what, by implication,
would be substances of the dependent nature,
and thereby implying that the specifically
characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent
collections of characteristics (Skt. svalaks.an.a;
Tib. rangtsen [rang mtshan]) of the Pramān.avāda are
true, independently existing realities (no wonder,
then, that most Tibetan doxographers classified
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as Cittamātrins).
However, as noted above, viewing the
absolutely true, abiding nature as either a positivity
or a negation of any possible kind, is as inadmissible
to me as Je Tsongkhapa’s and the Cittamātra
School’s respective conceptions of the absolute as
a purportedly nonimplicative negation. John Pettit
(1999, pp. 109-110), following Lipman (1981),
expressed the ideas Ju Mipham laid out in his
commentary to Śāntaraksita’s Madhyamakālamkāra
(translation adapted to my terminology) as follows:
the definitive absolute (don dam mtshan nyid
pa) must be understood as the nonconceptual
absolute that is revealed (to) superior (Skt.
ārya; Tib. phagpa [’phags pa]) bodhisattvas in
their Contemplation state (Skt. samāhita; Tib.
nyamzhak [mnyam bzhag]). The indivisibility
(Skt. yuganaddha; Tib. zungjug [zung ’ jug]) of
appearance and emptiness is the [true] absolute,
[which (is)] nonconceptual [and hence nondual],
and [which (is)] the content of the nondual
primordial gnosis of superior bodhisattvas.
[In fact,] this is the absolute according to
Candrakīrti’s Prāsangika Mādhyamaka, which
is accessed by a valid Gnition investigating the

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 151

Since affirmation and negation are relative to
each other, the absolute, which is that which is not
relative, simply could not be either positive or negative. In fact, since the absolute may not be conceived
in the dichotomous terms of secondary process—
that is, in terms of concepts—it could not involve
negation. Also, since, as emphasized by Buddhist
logic, in logical terms positivity results from the negation of a negation, the absolute could not be positive either.
For Dölpopa’s views, cf. Dol-bo-ba (2006),
Hopkins (2002) and Stearns (2010).
7. Dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal, p. 446b. In The
Complete Works of the Sakya Scholars, vol. 12. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1969. Thakchoe’s translation had
conventional instead of relative. Here one of the
phrases in brackets inserted by Thakchoe was deleted
and another one inserted instead, as I felt his view as
a Tsongkhapa follower was affecting his interpretation and hence his translation of Gorampa’s words.
For evaluating this translation, cf. the Tibetan original in the next paragraph of this note.
The Tibetan original reads: zhes pa’ i skabs nas
bstan pa’ i kun rdzob bden pa ni med de / yul can
mthong ba brdzun pa med pa / de’ i yul med pa’ i phyir
ro //. Thus readers knowing Tibetan may appreciate
that the translation offered is faithful to the original.
8.    Kun mkhyen pad ma dkar po, dbu ma’ i gzhung
gsum gsal byed, p. 121 (Saarnath, UP, India: Kargyud
Student’s Welfare Committee). For evaluating this
translation, cf. the Tibetan original: ji srid sgrib pa’ i
lhag ma yod pa de srid du / rjes thob pas snang ba’ i sna
tshogs ’ de dag sgyu ma lta bu la sogs par snang la / nam
bag chags thams cad yongs su dag pa na rnam pa thams
cad du kun rdzob kyi chos snang ma myong ba rang
bzhin nyid la dus thams cad du mnyam par ’ jog pa yin
no //. Thus readers knowing Tibetan may appreciate
that the translation offered is faithful to the original.

9. The grammatical errors were in the Wikipedia text
as accessed on September 2, 2010.
10. Was Nāgārjuna aware of the concept of the neutral
condition of the base-of-all? According to the traditions of the Nyingmapa (rnying ma pa) School
of Tibetan Buddhism codified in the authoritative
treatise Feast for the Erudite: A History of the Dharma (Chöjung Khepai Gatön [chos ’byung mkhas
pa’s dga’ ston]) written by Pawo Tsuglag Threngwa
(dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba: 1504-1566), Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva were lineage holders in one of the
two main lines of transmission of Dzogchen Atiyoga (Cf. Chögyal Namkhai Norbu, 1988)—which
some have taken to imply that the Mādhyamaka is
a philosophical explanation, adapted to the gradual
Mahāyāna, of the essential View of Dzogchen Ati.
11.    Tib. zhentong (gzhan stong); reconstructed Skt.
paraśūnya: literally emptiness (i.e., lack) of extraneous
substances, the meaning of the term is that of the
Tibetan zhengyi ngöpo tongpanyi (gzhan gyi dngos po
stong pa nyid)—emptiness of substances extraneous
[to the single true nature of reality]. To Dölpopa, this
implied the absolute nonexistence of the paratantra
posited by the Cittamātras. Cf. note 4 (for more detail,
cf. Chöphel & Capriles, 2013, and the upcoming
definitive versions of Capriles, 2004, 2005).
12. Actually, the teachings in question also posit a sequence of sixteen levels (Skt. bhūmi; Tib. sa), but do
so mainly to show that after the final achievement
of the Anuyoga, which is the highest attainment after those proper to Dzogchen Ati, a practitioner of
Dzogchen Ati still has a distance to travel—which
will involve going, while in this life, through the
intermediate state of the true condition of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā antarābhava; Tib. chönyi bardo
[chos nyid bar do]), as it is in that state that Thögel is
applied. (However, this does not mean that practitioners of Dzogchen Ati must first practice the other
vehicles: the supreme vehicle has its own, especially
swift methods for attaining its realizations.)
13. A second line of development is the Graves-inspired
one that Wilber has called values / spiral dynamics,
having as a first rung, on the right, one that is
centered on survival and that is at the same level of
the first rung of the first line; as a second rung on the
right, what he called the kin spirits, corresponding to
the first rung on the left, which is the one he called
magic-animistic—both of which are the level of the
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nonconceptual absolute. As it is free from mental
fabrications (Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. trödrel [spros
bral]), it is beyond affirmation and negation.”
(Note that instead of saying that the true
absolute is the indivisibility (Skt. yuganaddha;
Tib. zungjug [zung ’ jug]) of appearance and
emptiness I myself would have said instead that
it is unutterable, yet involves the indivisibility of
appearance and emptiness.)

second rung in the first line; as a third rung on the
right what he called the power gods, corresponding
to the second rung on the left, which is the one he
called egocentric—both of which are the level of the
third rung in the first line; as a fourth rung on the
right what he called the truth force, corresponding
to the third rung on the left, which is the one he
called absolutistic—both of which are at the level of
the fourth rung in the first line; as a fifth rung on the
right what he called the strive drive, corresponding
to the fourth rung on the left, which is the one he
called multiplistic—both of which are at the level of
the fifth rung in the first line; as a sixth rung on the
right what he called the human bond, corresponding
to the fifth rung on the left, which is the one he
called relativistic—both of which are at the level of
the sixth rung in the first line; as a seventh rung
on the right the one he called flex-flow, which is at
the level of the seventh rung in the first line; and
as an eighth rung on the right the one he called
global view, which is at the level of the eighth rung
in the first line—with what he called the systemic
as the sixth rung on the left, placed between the
corresponding seventh and eighth rungs of both the
first line and the right of the second line (this second
line hence not reaching beyond the eighth level of
the first line, and thus not reaching the third tier).
The third line is the Kegan-inspired one of
orders of consciousness, beginning with Orders 0,
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 4.5, which are, respectively, at the
level of the six lower stages of the first line and of the
right side of the second line, and ending with the 5th
Order, which lies at the level of the eighth stage of
both the first line and the right of the second line.
This line thus does not reach the third tier.
The fourth is the Loevinger/Cook/Greuterinspired line of self-identity that includes eight rungs
referred to as symbiotic, impulsive, self-protective,
conformist, conscientious, individualistic, autonomous and integrated, which are at the level of the
eight lower rungs of the first line and the right of
the second line, followed by an ninth stage, called
construct-aware—at the level of global mind in
the first line—and a final, tenth stage, called egoaware—which lies at the level of meta-mind on the
first line. The last two rungs are within the third tier.
The fifth is the Gebser-inspired line of
worldviews, which goes from the archaic (at the level
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of the first rung of lines one, three and four, as well
as of the right of the second line) through the magic
(between the second and third rungs of the first,
third and fourth lines, and of the right of the second
line), the mythic, the rational and the pluralistic (at
the level of the fourth, firth and sixth rungs of the
first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right
of the second line, respectively), up to the integral
(at the level of the systemic on the left of the second
line). This line does not reach into the third tier.
Finally, the sixth is the Fowler-inspired line
of stages of faith, going from (0) the one he called
undifferentiated (at the level of the first rung of the
first, third, fourth and fifth lines, as well as of the
right of the second line), through (1) the magical
(at the level of the second rung of the first, third
and fourth lines, as well as the right of the second
line), (2) the mythic-literal (at the level of the third
rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as
of the right of the second line), (3) the conventional
(at the level of the fourth rung of the first, third and
fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second
line—which as already noted are at the level of
the third rung of the fifth line), (4) the individualreflexive (at the level of the fifth rung of the first,
third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the
second line, and at the level of the fourth rung of
the fifth line), (5) the conjunctive (at the level of the
sixth rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well
as of the right of the second line, and of the fifth
rung of the fifth line), and (6) the universalizingcommonwealth, which is at the level of the systemic
at the left of the second line and of the integral on
the fifth line. Hence this line does not reach into the
third tier, either.
14. H. A. Orr is Shirley Cox Kearns Professor of Biology at the University of Rochester.
15. Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama, reported to be a State
Department publicist and often referred to as such,
is the author who became famous for his book The
End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama, 1992),
in which he proposed that there were no longer alternatives to Capitalist, anti-ecological consumerism—which, were it true, would mean that there are
no alternatives to the self-destruction of our species.
16. Though Carlson omitted these facts, Aurobindo
moved within extreme left-wing anarchist circles in
France and then, back in India, adopted one of the
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most extreme positions among activists of the independence movement. It was after he received death
threats that he abandoned his activism and went into
seclusion, devoting himself solely to spiritual practice, teaching and writing.
17. The only version of the book in question I have is
[a photocopy of] the 1995 original edition, as Bolivarian Venezuela’s foreign currency restrictions prevent me from buying all books published by transpersonal and integral theorists. Moreover, even in
the absence of these impediments, I would not buy
all of Wilber’s works as he publishes them, as I have
so much to read for the research at the root of the
several books I am writing; moreover, Wilber is a
secondary matter in my writing, which must address
many far more important views and points—and,
moreover, for me reading him is not a pleasant task.
18. The source Wilber (2001b, note 1, pp. 717-741) gave
for his presentation of the progressive attainment of
the four kāyas is none else than the infamous Geshe
Kelsang Gyamtso (usually written without the “m”
in Gyamtso; cited repeatedly by Wilber in the same
note, pp. 726-729), leader of the most recently created Tibetan Buddhist School, which is universally viewed by Tibetans (except for members of the
school in question) as the terrorist organization that
committed a bloody triple murder against important
associates of the Dalai Lama and that has repeatedly tried to murder the illustrious Buddhist Master
and Tibetan political leader. Concerning these accusations, cf. the original Newsweek article (Clifton
& Miller, 1997) and the book with the exhaustive
investigation by Raimondo Bultrini (2008), among
other sources.
19. This is the reason why, in spite of conceding that the
etymological meaning of both the Sanskrit term
samvrti and Tibetan term kundzob (kun rdzob),
which as a rule are rendered as relative or, in Gelugpa translations, conventional, was the one offered
in Vol. I of The Beyond Mind Papers: Transpersonal and Metatranspersonal Theory (Capriles, in press)
and notes to Vol. II of the same book—namely that
of all-concealing, which for me has the implication of all-distorting—in his Tsashe Tikchen Rigpai
Gyamtso (rtsa shes tik chen rigs pa’ i mrgya mtso, pp.
402-403 [Saarnath, UP, India: Gelugpa Students
Welfare Committee, 1992]; cf. Thakchoe, 2007, p.
47) he asserted relative or conventional reality not

to be always all-concealing / all-distorting. This is
because he posited a mere existence which in his
view was warranted, valid, and correct, and an inherent / hypostatic existence that he deemed to be a
mere illusion and as such unwarranted, wrong and
invalid—for it was the most basic manifestation
of the unawareness cum delusion that the Buddha
Śākyamuni called avidyā (Pāli: avijjā; Tib. ma rig
pa). This assertion of a mere existence that was a relative, yet not all-concealing / all-distorting reality
was contested by nearly all non-Gelugpas, and with
the passing of time it was objected even by a number
of Gelugpas.
20. The Tibetan zhenngo khelen (gzhan ngo khas len) is
related to the Sanskrit paraprasiddha (Tib. zhenla
drakpa [gzhan la grags pa] or simply zhendrak [gzhan
grags]), though it does not have exactly the same
meaning. The assertions called zhenngo khelen are
the opposite of self-directed assertions (Tib. rangyü
dukhe lenpa [rang rgyud du khes len pa]—which for
its part is related to the Sanskrit svaprasiddha and
the Tibetan rangla drakpa [rang la grags pa] or simply rangdrak [rang grags]), though it does not have
exactly the same meaning. Since Tsongkhapa does
not accept the existence of other-directed assertions,
he redefined the term in such a way that all assertions are of the kind that the original Prāsangika
called self-directed.
21. This would be correct if nirodha were understood
as the mere cessation of suffering that constitutes
the Third Noble Truth (Skt. duhkha-nirodha-āryasatya), yet is utterly wrong when understood in the
sense of lack of manifestation or blankness—which
is what the nirodha of nirodhasamāpatti that Wilber
takes as paradigmatic is.
22. For the Mādhyamaka Prāsangika School emptiness
is, indeed, emptiness of self-existence (Skt. svabhāva
śūnyatā; Tib. rangtong [rang stong] or rangzhingyi
tongpanyi [rang bzhin gyi stong pa nyid]—except
for Je Tsongkhapa, who preferred rangzhingyi
madrubpa [rang bzhin gyis ma grub pa]; Chin.
Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn, zìxìngkòng; Wade-Giles, tzu-hsingk’ung]; Jap. jishōkū). As noted in the regular text
after the reference mark for this note, Je Tsongkhapa
and the great bulk of his Gelugpa brethen—
and recently also the so-called New Kadampas,
headed by the reported source of Wilber’s last four
fulcra—on the basis of the Svātantrikas’ categorized
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(conceptual, lower, provisional) ultimate truth
(Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrang mayinpai
döndam [rnam grangs ma yin pa’ i don dam]) that is
found through the method of insight meditation
(Pāli: vipassanā; Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong [lhag
mthong]; Chin. Hàny ǔ Pīnyīn: guān; Wade-Giles,
kuan; Jap. kan]) expounded in the Bhāvanākramas
by Svātantrika Masters Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla,
misunderstood the Prāsangika emptiness as
consisting in the presence of an absence—namely,
as being the absence of the “inherent / hypostatic or
true existence” we mistakenly project on and perceive
in all entities, which they assert to become present in
the insight meditation that Je Tsongkhapa borrowed
from the Bhāvanākramas by the aforementioned
Svātantrika Masters, when applied on the basis of
the system devised by Tsongkhapa.
On the contrary, according to the
Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (which the Chinese
attribute to Nāgārjuna and is extant in Kumārajīva’s
Chinese translation only), the Dzogchen teachings,
the original Indian and the non-Gelug Tibetan
understanding of Mādhyamaka Prāsangika, and
the Mahāmādhyamaka School, the absolute is not
a mere emptiness of self-existence. In particular,
Nyingmapa Masters have insisted that such an
emptiness cannot be the absolute truth, because
the latter, which is fully patent in Buddhahood, is
the source and true condition of everything and, in
particular, is the source of the qualities inherent in
Buddhahood—whereas emptiness thus conceived
cannot account for the manifestation, either of the
universe or of the qualities proper to Buddhahood.
For example, according to Sakyapa Master
Gorampa Sönam Sengé (go rams pa bsod nams seng
ge: 1429-1489), absolute or ultimate truth is no other
than primordial gnosis (Skt. jñāna; Tib. yeshe [ye
shes]) itself (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 13), which rather
than being the presence of a mere absence, is a fully
active plenitude. He wrote (cited in Thakchoe, 2007,
p. 15; the translation was adapted to the terminology
used in this book):
Here in the Madhyamaka system, the object
itself cannot be divided into the two truths.
Relative truth and absolute truth are established
in terms of modes of apprehension (mthong
tshul): in terms of the [spurious mental] subject
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apprehending falsehood and the Awareness
apprehending truth; or of mistaken and
unmistaken apprehensions (’ khrul ma ’ khrul); or
of deluded or undeluded apprehensions (rmongs
ma rmongs); or of erroneous or nonerroneous
apprehensions (phying ci log ma log), or of valid
Gnition or invalid cognition (tshad ma yin
min).” (Ngedön Rabsel [nges don rab gsal], p.
375b; careful substantiation in p. 375b-d.)
The view according to which the absolute or
ultimate truth is no other than undeluded primordial
gnosis, and relative truth is the deluded perspective
of the obscured consciousness of sentient beings, is
shared by the most widely acclaimed Masters of all
Tibetan Schools except for the Gelug: Longchen
Rabjampa, Sakya Pan. d.ita, Rongtön Shakya
Gyaltsen, Ju Mipham, Taksang Lotsawa, Shakya
Chogden, the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje,
Gendün Chöphel and so on (all of these Masters
except for Gendün Chöphel are listed in Thakchoe
[2007, p. 15]; as for Chöphel, cf. Chöphel [2005]).
The great Nyingmapa Master Rongzom Pan. d.ita
(Rongzompa Chökyi Zangpo [rong zom pa chos kyi
bzang po]), rather than positing emptiness as the
absolute truth, asserted the latter to consist in the
true condition of [all] phenomena (Skt. dharmatā;
Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]). However, this should not
be taken to mean that the absolute truth is not
or cannot be emptiness, for both terms are often
regarded as synonyms. In fact, Ju Mipham agreed
that emptiness may be the absolute truth, but only
if emptiness is not understood as a negation. Karma
Phuntsho (2005, p. 9; terminology adapted to the
one used in this book) wrote:
The Gelugpas understood the ultimate qua
emptiness to be an absence of inherent existence
and therefore a nonimplicative negation…
[Ju] Mipham, on the contrary, argued
that the absolute qua emptiness, in its highest
form, is not merely an absence of inherent
existence. He enumerated two kinds of
ultimate, the conceptual, provisional ultimate
(Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. rnam grangs pa’ i
don dam) and the nonconceptual definitive
absolute (Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. rnam
grangs ma yin pa’ i don dam), and relegated the
mere absence of inherent existence to the level
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of conceptual, provisional ultimate, which, also
known as the ultimate that is concordant [with
the absolute (condition)] (Skt. paramārthānukūla
[-paramārtha]; Tib. döndampa dang thunpai
döndampa [don dam pa dang mthun pa (’ i don
dam pa)]), eliminates only partial extremes and
serves as a step on the way to the nonconceptual,
definitive absolute. The nonconceptual,
definitive absolute qua final emptiness, which is
the quidditas* and the absolute nature of things,
he argued, is reality free from all fabrications
(Skt. prapañca; Tib. spros pa) and extremes (Skt.
anta; Tib. mtha’). He also used terms such as
total indivisibility (Tib. zung ’ jug chen po [Skt.
mahāyuganaddha]), Total Middle Way (Tib. dbu
ma chen po [Skt. mahāmādhyamaka]), Resultant
Middle Way (Tib. ’bras bu’ i dbu ma [Skt.
phalamādhyamaka]) and Equality (Tib. mnyam
nyid [Skt. Skt. samatā; Tib. mnyam nyid) to refer
to this.
To be or not to be are both extremes,
and emptiness as the philosophical middle
way, Mipham argued, must transcend the
extremes of being and nonbeing, existence
and nonexistence, negation and affirmation,
and even the empty and the nonempty. Even
to perceive emptiness itself would be wrong,
for there is nothing (not even that nothing!)
to be perceived. To conceive a thing called
“emptiness” in discerning emptiness is a gross
reification, the wrong understanding Nāgārjuna
repudiated in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, XIII/8
and XXIV/11.
For his part, Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (dol po
pa shes rab rgyal mtshan), his Jonangpa followers
and many non-Gelug, rime (ris med: non-sectarian)
Tibetan Masters adhering to Mahāmādhyamaka,
posit voidness as the absolute truth. However, as
stated in a previous note, the voidness they posit as
the absolute is the emptiness of substances other than
the dharmakāya, or the Buddha-nature, and so forth
(Tib. zhentong [gzhan stong]; Skt. reconstruction,
paraśūnyatā)—which is a view both Tsongkhapa
and his great Sakyapa critic, Gorampa Sönam Senge
(go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) most
emphatically rejected (among other sources, cf.
Hopkins, 2002; Cabezón, 2003).
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The intent behind my criticism is not to make
Wilber embrace the non-Gelug understanding
of the absolute, but to expose his confusion and
contradictions, for if he embraced the standard
Gelug description of the progressive attainment
of the four kāyas, then by implication he was
adopting the standard Gelug view of the ultimate as
emptiness qua presence of an absence, from which
the description in question is inextricable—but
then he is forbidden from identifying it with the
Base of Dzogchen, which is not a mere voidness, or
with Ayin, which is not a mere absence. Also, if he
embraced the non-Gelug views according to which
the absolute is primordial gnosis, the dharmatā, or
an emptiness that is not a mere absence, and so forth,
or the related Dzogchen view according to which
the complete manifestation of what the Mahāyāna
calls the absolute (the Dzogchen teachings place no
emphasis whatsoever on the concept of “absolute”)
is the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen, then the
absolute cannot be Tsongkhapa’s emptiness (which,
at any rate, does not match Wilber’s descriptions
of emptiness) and, by implication, Wilber may not
adhere to Tsongkhapa’s description of the progressive
attainment of the kāyas, as the latter is inextricable
from Tsongkhapa’s conception of the ultimate truth.
In other words, once more Wilber incurred in the
repeatedly denounced error of viewing incompatible
concepts pertaining to incompatible systems as being
just the same, as though he were a bootstrapper who
has produced a superior synthesis of all teachings—
when what he has actually done is to obliterate the
most essential distinctions in Buddhism and in this
way produce a confusion that may block advance on
the Path to Awakening.
*The term quidditas is understood here in the sense
of the Aristotelian to ti en einai or “that which [an
essent] was before having come into being”—i.e.,
that which it (is) in truth—rather than in the
Thomistic sense of form that, united to matter,
determines what a thing is, or in the sense of essence
in which the term is generally understood in Western
philosophy.
23. In some sūtras that negate existence, one finds the
term “existence” qualified by an adjective or by an
adverb; for example, in the Sutra of Transcendent
Discriminating Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand
Stanzas (Skt. Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā; Tib.
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[short] Bum Do [’bum mdo]; [middle] Sherphin Tongtrak Gyapa Do [sher phyin stong phrag brgya pa mdo];
[in full] shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag
brgya pa mdo) one can find the term “existence” categorized as “absolute” or “ultimate” (Skt. paramārtha;
Tib. döndam [don dam]). Likewise, in the works by
Nāgārjuna, in a few occasions he referred to the existence he negated by the term “self-existence” (Skt.
svabhāva; Tib. rangzhin [rang bzhin]). However, in
the works by Candrakīrti the term “self-existence” is
found quite a few times, as it was Candrakīrti who
first posited a need to make the meaning of the term
“existence”—that is, what is to be negated—more
specific, and in quite a few occasions actually did so.
The insight (Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong
[lhag mthong]) meditation Je Tsongkhapa taught
as a means to purportedly arrive at emptiness as
conceived by the Mādhyamaka Prāsangika was the
one taught in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra (a Third
Promulgation text that the Cittamātra—the lower,
“idealist” school of the Mahāyāna—takes as its root
canonical source and that is a key source for the
Mādhyamaka Svātantrika Yogācāra as well [and for
Mahāmādhyamaka, which, however, contextualizes
its teachings])—which, as stated in a previous note,
he adopted in the version that Svātantrika-Yogācāra
Masters Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla produced in
their respective Bhāvanākramas. Thus overlooking
the indivisibility between Path and Fruit emphasized
in the Śūrangamasūtra, among other canonical
sources, he employed a method of a lower system to
purportedly arrive at a realization of a higher system.
So it does not seem to be a mere coincidence that
he taught the difference between “mere existence”
and “inherent / hypostatic / reified existence,” which
seems to be related to that between (1) the nature
that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the Cittamātra
philosophical school calls dependent nature (Skt.
paratantra; Tib. zhenwang [gzhan dbang]) and (2)
the nature that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the
Cittamātra philosophical school call imaginary
nature (Skt. parikalpita; Tib. kuntag [kun brtags]).
In fact, as stated in a previous note, Tsongkhapa
understood the qualification of existence as true in
the Tibetan term denpar yöpa (bden par yod pa) or as
inherent / hypostatic / reified in the Tibetan term
rangzhingyi yöpa (rang bzhin gyi yod pa) to mean that
there was another kind of existence that was not true
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or inherent, and hence he coined the term “mere
existence” (Tib. yöpa tsam [yod pa tsam]) to refer to
it—which is to some extent similar to the mode of
existence that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the
Cittamātra school attribute to the dependent nature
(the definition of which is, however, less specific). An
example of “mere existence” was the presence in the
world of the corporeal pattern one typically calls pot,
and the actuality and functionality of this corporeal
configuration, which Tsongkhapa viewed as the
“merely existent pot.” An example of the illusion of
inherent existence or true existence—which above I
compared with imaginary nature, even though it is
not exactly the same—was the delusive apprehension
of the same corporeal configuration as having a selfnature (Skt. svabhāva; Tib. rangzhin [rang bzhin])
and hence as being a self-existent pot. Having taken
the distinction between these two senses of the term
existence as the key to the correct understanding
of Mādhyamaka, Tsongkhapa systematically
categorized as inherent / hypostatic / reified, or as
true, the existence that was the object of negation in
Mādhyamika refutations (though of course he did
not insist that these qualifiers should be introduced
into the Tibetan translations of traditional texts
each and every time the term existence was used,
and he did not introduce them each and every time
he himself used the term in his own texts).
However, though at first sight the distinction
may seem quite sound, the truth is that it is hardly
applicable to the experience of sentient beings. In
fact, so long as threefold avidyā and hence sam
. s āra
is active, whenever one perceives something as existing or as being (or think of something as existing
or as being), the super-subtle thought-structure attributing existence or being to that entity is delusorily valued, giving rise to what the Gelugpas refer
to as the “illusion of inherent existence” or “illusion
of true existence.” Therefore, for sentient beings in
sam
. s āra the term “existence” always refers to a delusive phenomenon that manifests in their mental
continuum—which is roughly what Tsongkhapa,
on the basis of writings by Candrakīrti, systematically called inherent existence or true existence.
Conversely, when one goes beyond sam
. s āra one no
longer perceives anything as existing or as being.
To express it in my own terms, what is normally understood by being is the delusive phenomenon
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that results from the delusory valuation-absolutization of the concept of being, whereas what one
normally understands by nonbeing is the delusive
phenomenon that results from the same concept’s
delusory valuation-absolutization when a negation
is affixed to it—and when this delusory valuation
does not occur there is no phenomenon of being and
hence no nonbeing. Since the Mādhyamikas were
not heedless people who contradicted the laws of
logic for the sake of it, it is clear that by denying both
existence and nonexistence they were asserting the
delusive character, both of the experience of being
or existence that results from delusory valuation-absolutization of the concept of being, and of that of
nonbeing or nonexistence. Thus there is no need to
categorize the negated existence as inherent or the
negated nonexistence as utter.
The above term and the distinction at its root
were rejected by followers of Candrakīrti other
than those who followed Tsongkhapa, often before
the latter placed an emphasis on it. Among the
former it is worth mentioning Indian philosopherpractitioner Jayānanda and Tibetan philosopherpractitioners such as Longchen Rabjam, Gorampa
Sönam Sengé, Rendawa, Rongtön Shakya Gyaltsen,
Tatsang Lotsawa, Shakya Chogden, Ju Mipham,
and Gendün Chöphel (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 61)—
and, among twentieth century non-Tibetans,
Stcherbatsky, Lindtner, Poussin, Singh and Murti,
who insisted that the appearance of existence is
always the appearance of inherent existence, for
no beings experience an existence that is not the
illusion that Tsongkhapa called inherent existence,
and that it is therefore superfluous and at the same
time misleading to emphasize the distinction the
founder of the Gelug School stressed. In fact, all of
the aforementioned Tibetan Masters have placed a
strong emphasis on the etymology of the word that is
regularly rendered as relative or conventional (truth),
samvrti (satya); in Gorampa’s version (Thakchoe, op.
cit., pp. 48-49):

[the Tibetan translation of samvrtisatya])… Satya
(denpa [bden pa]) means ‘truth.’ It is truth in the
sense that it appears true from the perspective of
deluded consciousness. (pp. 48-49)

In the first [etymological explanation of]
samvrtisatya, sam is [an abbreviated form] of
samyag, meaning ‘reality,’ and vrti means ‘to
conceal.’ Since it conceals the true meaning of
reality, delusion—the [mistaken] conception of
true existence—is a model of kunzob (kun rdzob

Gorampa juxtaposed verses 6:23 and 6:28 of
Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra to show that the
“perceiver of falsities” mentioned in 6:23 is whoever
is under the power of the timug (gti mug)—bewilderment or concealer—referred to in 6:28 (Thakchoe, op. cit., p. 67).
Translated into Third Promulgation terminology, the above signifies that the absolutely true,
abiding nature (Skt. parinis.panna; Tib. yongdrub
[yongs grub]) is empty, not only of the imaginary
nature (parikalpita; Tib. kuntag [kun brtags]), as the
Cittamātrins inferred on the basis of many passages
of the Sam.dhinirmocanasūtra, but also of the
dependent nature (Skt. paratantra; Tib. zhenwang
[gzhan dbang]), as Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen
concluded mostly on the basis of the higher Third
Promulgation Sūtras. (Tsongkhapa’s interest in this
regard was whether this emptiness was asserted
from a conventional or an ultimate perspective:
like Bhāvaviveka, he needed it to be conventionally
existent while at the same time being ultimately
nonexistent.)
Finally, as stated in a previous endnote, the
Svātantrikas from whom Tsongkhapa borrowed
the meditation whereby in his view ultimate truth
was to be realized—namely Śāntaraksita and his
disciple, Kamalaśīla—like most Svātantrikas (and
like the Prāsangika Mipham, referred to above in
this regard) distinguished between two ultimates:
the true absolute truth, called uncategorized
absolute (Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. rnam grangs
ma yin pa’ i don dam), which is free from conceptual
fabrications (Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. spros bral), and
an ultimate that was not the true absolute truth,
for it was conceptual—and thus was called the
categorized ultimate (Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib.
namdrangpai döndam [rnam grangs pa’ i don dam])
or ultimate that is concordant [with the absolute
(condition)] (Skt. paramārthānukūla [-paramārtha];
Tib. döndampa dang thunpai döndampa [don dam
pa dang mthun pa’ i don dam pa]) because it was
intended to be an approximate concept that could be
used to gain a conceptual (and as such by definition
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imprecise and deforming) understanding of the true
absolute truth.
Well, whereas the above Svātantrikas viewed
the emptiness that resulted from the meditation
they taught and that consisted in the presence of
an absence, as a provisional approximation to the
true absolute (i.e., as a categorized ultimate that
is concordant with the absolute) after which the
nonconceptual, direct realization of the true absolute
truth (namely of the uncategorized absolute) had to
be realized, Je Tsongkhapa asserted the presence of
an absence that manifested at the term of the analysis
to be the only and therefore the true ultimate truth,
after which no other ultimate had to be realized.
Therefore, Je Tsongkhapa’s purported Prāsangika
view in this regard was not only in disagreement with
the genuine Prāsangika, but was also considerably
lower than the view of the Svātantrikas.
24. However, this view is in agreement with Mahāyāna
teachings other than Tsongkhapa’s, such as those
that refer to the true condition of our human selves
and the whole of reality by terms such as: (1) true
condition of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; Tib.
dezhinnyi [de bzhin nyid]) / thatness (Skt. tathatā;
Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]); Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn,
zhēnrú; Wade-Giles, chen-ju; or Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, rúshì;
Wade-Giles, ju-shih; Jap. shinnyo or nyoze; (2) kernel
of Buddhahood (Skt. tathāgatagarbha; Tib. dezhin
shegpai nyingpo [de bzhin gshegs pa’ i snying po] / Skt.
sugatagarbha; Tib. desheg nyingpo [de gshegs snying
po]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, rúláizàng; Wade-Giles,
ju-lai-tsang]); (3) Buddha-nature (Skt. buddhatā or
buddhatva; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, fóxìng; Wade-Giles
fo-hsing; Jp. butsushō or busshō] / bhūtatathatā; Chin.
Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zhènrú; Wade-Giles, chen-ju]; Jap.
shinnyo); (4) [with the emphasis on the disclosure
of the condition in question] absolute truth (Skt.
paramārthasatya; Tib. nam drangpai döndam [rnam
grangs pa’ i don dam]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zhēndì;
Wade-Giles, chen-ti; Jap. shintai] / Hànyǔ Pīnyīn,
dìyīyì; Wade-Giles, ti-i-i; Jap. shogitai]; etc.)—so
long as the truth in question is not identified with
a negation or with the presence of a mere absence.
Moreover, it is also in agreement with the view of
those who, like Ju Mipham, among many others,
have identified the ultimate as emptiness yet do not
understand the latter as consisting in a negation / an
absence’s presence.

The Dzogchen teachings make it clear that the
true condition of both ourselves as humans and the
whole of reality is the Base of Dzogchen, which is the
full, genuine referent of the Mahāyāna concepts listed
above—all of which fall short of the condition of Dzogchen, as both the understanding and the realization
of this condition obtained in Mahāyāna Buddhism are
partial (cf. Chögyal Namkhai Norbu [1984]; Capriles
[2000, 2003]). In particular, qua Buddha-nature or
kernel of Buddhahood it is fully actual, and it is said
to involve two aspects, which are primordial purity or
katak (ka dag), which is emptiness, and spontaneous
perfection or lhundrub (lhun grub).
At any rate, it is this Base that Wilber called
the unborn, changeless ground—even though as
noted above the Base in question is not at all the
same as emptiness (and far less as the presence of an
absence), for according to these teachings emptiness
is no more than an illusory experience (Tib. nyam
[nyams]) on the Path or, if understood with regard
to the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen, only one
of its aspects: it is the primordial purity or katak
aspect, which has spontaneous perfection or lhundrub as its counterpart—the latter involving the
spontaneous arising of experience and consummate
spontaneous functions of the manifest. (Note that
Wilber spoke of understanding emptiness, when the
emptiness that is important on the Path, rather than
an understanding, is a nonconceptual realization.)
25. The words within the brackets express my explanation of an abbreviation Wilber used instead
26. In the same paragraph of the regular text I noted that
emptiness—not qua illusory experience, nor qua an
entity’s nonexistence or lack of self-existence, but
in reference to the Base—is only one of the latter’s
aspects—namely the primordial purity (Tib. katak
[ka dag]) or essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect. If
the emptiness that Wilber posited were the same as
the primordial purity / essence aspect of the Base,
identifying it with “the unborn or the changeless
ground”—that is, with the Base—would amount to
identifying an aspect or part of a whole [emptiness
thus understood] with the whole itself [the Base of
Dzogchen]—which would be a major logical error.
27. As stated in a previous endnote, Wilber (2001b,
note 1, pp. 717-741) gave as the source for his view
on the progressive attainment of the four kāyas,
none else than infamous Geshe Kelsang Gyamtso
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(second name usually written without the “m;” cited
repeatedly by Wilber in the same note, pp. 726729), who leads the most recent Tibetan Buddhist
School, universally viewed by Tibetans (except for
members of the school in question) as a terrorist
organization that committed a bloody triple murder
against associates of the Dalai Lama and that has
repeatedly tried to murder the illustrious Tibetan
Master-leader. Regarding these accusations, cf. the
original Newsweek article (Clifton & Miller, 1997)
and the exhaustive investigation by Raimondo
Bultrini (2008), among other sources.
Furthermore, to his quotations of his dubious
source Wilber added phrases in brackets such as
“[which are both subtle-level illuminations]” and
“[causal cessation],” which are very likely to distort
the author’s intended meaning.
At any rate, the edition I have of Sex, Ecology,
Spirituality is the 1st (Wilber, 1995) rather than the
2nd, which is the one that Abramson (2010) used
(namely Wilber, 2001b) and the one featuring the
notes he referred to. Since due to foreign currency
limitations it is so difficult to buy foreign books in
Venezuela, and since I have so much to read for the
research at the root of the several books I am writing, and reading Wilber is for me a rather unpleasant
task, I never bought that 2nd ed.
28. Personally, I do not read the works in questions because time limitations make me be highly selective
with what I read (and, moreover, I would certainly
not use my extremely limited access to non-Venezuelan currencies to buy his books). As to my advice
to others, it comes from Chögyal Namkhai Norbu
and other important Masters, who warn students
against all possible contacts with anything having
to do with the Gyalpo demon that the character in
question and his associates worship, on the grounds
that such contacts have the potential of making the
individual susceptible to that demon and other beings of its class. If the reader finds this strange, he
or she may refer to my non-magical explanations of
the inner meaning of the term “demon” in Chapter
I of the upcoming book synthesizing the contents
of the Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, in press) and
my non-magical explanation of the inner meaning of
guardians and elementals elsewhere (Capriles, 2000,
2003). (In my retreats in the higher Himalayas a series of circumstances made me enter in conflict with

worshippers of that Gyalpo demon, and strange
events took place which included the destruction of
buildings and human lives; since the account of this
conflict would make a most interesting reading, I
might write it down at some point.) As to the alleged
dangerousness of the character in question, I have
repeatedly directed readers to the original Newsweek article (Clifton & Miller, 1997) and to the exhaustive investigation reported in Bultrini (2008).
29. In fact, in Wilber (2007), Appendix II, “Integral
Post-Metaphysics” (p. 234), one reads:
1.   It is not justified to maintain that levels of
reality exist as consciousness-independent
structures just waiting to be discovered;
rather, if there exist levels of reality, they
exist as structures of human consciousness
(that are co-constructed by subjects),
2. The verification methods for the existence
of these structures of consciousness must
involve demands for objective evidence
(modernity’s contribution) and intersubjective grounding (postmodernity’s contribution), and
3. If structures of consciousness exist, they
are not eternal and timeless structures
but ‘forms that have developed in time,
evolution, and history’. (p. 234, emphasis in
original)
30. Note in Abramson (2010):
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But not historical eras. Although Wilber agrees
that people of previous eras can advance to
spiritual states irrespective of their stage of
development, he continues to posit (as in
Up from Eden, 1981) that some of the most
“advanced” spiritual states were not attained
in previous eras—i.e., the most advanced
state increased from psychic in the “magic”
era, through subtle and causal in succeeding
eras, and only reached non-dual in the current
era. This is clearly completely at variance with
Capriles degenerative view of evolution. Also
Capriles would maintain true Awakening/nondual states were potentially available, in any era,
to anyone, at any stage of development, following
an authentic (e.g. Dzogchen) spiritual path.
31. Wilber did so in the context of “proving” that, however much meditation accelerates stage develop-

ment, cultural factors can potentially be a dominant
breaking force.
32. As noted repeatedly, the character in question is
accused of killing three associated of the Dalai Lama
and of being behind at least three murder attempts
against the great Tibetan spiritual and political
leader. Once more I refer the reader interested in
understanding the reasons for this, to Clifton with
Miller (1997) and the exhaustive investigation
reported in Bultrini (2008).
33. The actual title is “Beyond Mind,” for the term
“mind” is used to refer to a funcioning or a condition (as in “beyond fear”) rather than to a substance
(as in “beyond the ocean”).
34. Cf. endnote 23.
35.   True enough, he mentioned that for me the accessibility of Communion will result from a reductio
ad absurdum, and inserted a note that may give a
clue to readers, but readers who are not very familiar
with my views, and/or who do not read the notes,
will miss this point.
36. Someone so informed as Wilber must necessarily be
aware of the ecological situation of this planet and
its consequences, and hence if he writes as though
everything could continue to be the same for very
long time without this resulting in our species’
self-destruction, he must necessarily be doing so on
purpose. If he were not, then he would seem to be
wearing blinders without noticing them.
37. “Since God is totally Good, He cannot deceive us,
and hence he could not have instilled in us the belief in an external, physical reality if the latter were
nonexistent.”
38. Allegedly, at least one letter by Kant was found recently in which he confessed not to believe any of
the postulates of his own system, and to have produced the latter by order of a high political authority. However, most of those who hold Kant’s system
dear, assert the letter to be apocryphal.
39. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which
represents his first period, Wittgenstein (1961) asserted
language to be incapable of expressing reality, yet he
still pretended to use language in order to distinguish
atomic propositions that do not represent atomic
events from those that do represent them and thus
clarify the misconceptions produced by language,
reaching a point at which language could finally be
discarded (thus not being so far from the alternative

trend in the philosophy of language). In his second
period, principally represented by the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein (1972) noted that humans
suffer from a bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language that gave rise to false problems—
or that placed us in false labyrinths—that then
philosophers would try in vain to solve, and declared
all that he had written in his first period to be a
product of the bewitchment in question, insisting
that we had to rid ourselves from this bewitchment
(and thus setting himself in a position that could
hardly be more distant from that of the alternative
trend in the philosophy of language) and in this way
rid ourselves of the false problems seen from the
labyrinths produced by language.
It must be noted that, although the Vienna Circle claimed to follow Wittgenstein, the latter asserted logical positivism to be a gross misreading of his
writings, and went so far as to read poetry during
the Circle’s meetings.
40. A perfect adæquatio or matching is impossible because, as shown in Vol. I of The Beyond Mind Papers: Transpersonal and Metatranspersonal Theory
(Capriles, in press), conceptual maps are digital,
whereas the territory they interpret is analog (the discrepancy between these two being aptly illustrated
by the relationships between a digital photograph,
which is discontinuous, and what it represents,
which is continuous and to which therefore it cannot
correspond: if the number of dpis is extremely high,
one may get the illusion that it looks roughly alike,
but as soon as one zooms in all one sees is a combination of squares of different colors having no resemblance whatsoever with reality); because the territory
is holistic, whereas the maps of language are lineal
and fragmentary; and because from different viewpoints different maps are equally valid and, for the
same reason, equally incapable of perfect correspondence with what they represent. However, the problem arises when the fragmentary outlook the Buddha
(Udāna, Tathāgatagarbhasūtra) represented with the
fable of the men with the elephant takes its perceptions to fit the undivided, holistic territory they interpret—and in general when one confuses the map
with the territory or takes it to perfectly correspond
to it, as happens when the basic human delusion that
the Buddha called avidyā and Heraclitus called lethe
is active. Cf. also Capriles (2004) and other works.
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41. Sorel’s apology of violence is to be rejected with all
of one’s might.
42. Gramsci (1998) wrote: “In reality science is also a
superstructure, an ideology.”
43. As shown in Appendix I to Capriles (in press), science and technology were being developed long before the modern age in Greece, and were particularly dear to the Pythagorians, to whose ideology they
were associated at the time. However, Christianization suspended the project until the Modern Age,
when it was revived in its present form, in the way
expressed in the section of the regular text to which
this note was appended.
45. I discussed this thesis by Marcuse (which he put
forward in ch. 6 of Marcuse [1964], “From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality
and the Logic of Domination”) elsewhere (Capriles,
2007a Vol. III).
46. Deleuze is criticized in two different sections of
Sokal & Bricmont (1999); however, the theory according to which philosophy and the sciences are
“more than ideologies” is not among the objects of
this criticism.
47.   
In his Commentary to Āryadeva’s Catuhśatakaśāstrakārikā, the Catuhśatakatīkā, Buddhist
Mādhyamika-Prāsangika Master and philosopher
Candrakīrti told the fable of a king that consulted
a famous astrologer, who predicted that a rainfall
of “maddening water” would pollute the reservoirs
in his kingdom, as a consequence of which all who
drank from them would be driven insane. Consequently the king commanded that a giant, covered
reservoir be built for him to drink from, and warned
his ministers and subjects, telling them to prepare a
protected supply of water and avoid drinking the deranging water. However, the subjects, unable to build
reservoirs as big as the king’s, or even as the ministers’, exhausted their reserves quite rapidly, and soon
had to drink contaminated water. Since the king
and the ministers behaved quite differently from the
subjects who drank the maddening water, the latter
concluded that the former had become insane. Then,
when the ministers used up their reserves, they also
had to drink the deranging water—upon which the
rest of the subjects “realized” the ministers had come
to their senses, and all agreed the only one who was
still insane was the king. Hence in order to keep his
kingdom and avoid being impeached and put into

an asylum, the king had no option but to drink the
polluted water (Trungpa, 1976; Chöphel, 2005; Sūfī
version in Shah, 1970).
48. It has been alleged that the project of modernity,
rather than being aimed at begetting a technological Eden, was intended to allow the ruling class to
increase its exploitation of the rest of human society,
and that the ideal of the technological Eden was no
more than a façade or a pretext. However, it does
not seem likely that the promoters of the project in
question (or at least the majority of them) were intentionally deceiving others in this way—and since
the wealthiest and most powerful people and their
descendents would be destroyed together with the
rest of society, the project’s effects would indicate
delusion to have been at its root even if the interpretation discussed in this note were correct.
49. It is well known that the initial philosophical elaboration of the project of modernity was carried our
in its empiricist version by Francis Bacon, and in
its rationalist version by René Descartes. Later on,
positivism gave a different expression to it, and the
same did the grand systems of modernity, among
which the most renowned are Hegel’s and Marx’s.
In general, almost all philosophers of the modern
era (with exceptions such as Georges Sorel and a few
others) elaborated different versions of the myth in
question.
50. A lengthier discussion of this subject is featured in
Capriles (2007a, Vol. III); my initial discussion of
the subject appeared in Capriles (1994) and there
is an ample discussion of it in the Introduction to
Capriles (2012).
51. That which Kant called “transcendental illusion(s)”
consisted in going beyond the empirical use of the
categories of the Understanding and applying these
categories to “transcendent objects”—which most
key twentieth century phenomenologists did not
posit. However, according to Kant, the transcendental illusion stood on subjective principles that seemed
to be objective; provided that one understands the
term subjective as referring to whatever manifests in
the individual’s mind—that is, thoughts, representations, mental phenomena—as different from all
that is not merely thought or representation, this is
the core error of phenomenology.
52. In Capriles, 2007a Vol. I, I undertook an exhaustive
discussion of the defects of phenomenological and
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existential twentieth century thought, on the basis
of a careful hermeneutical analysis of the essential
works of the thinkers concerned.
53.  In spite of having received important influences from
Buddhism and Daoism, and of having claimed that
Zen Buddhism broadcaster D. T. Suzuki was saying
exactly what he tried to say throughout his works
(May, 1996; Saviani, 2004), in itself Heidegger’s concept of being (das Sein) was not only contradictory,
but contrary to Buddhist theory as well. In fact, on
the one hand he identified it with the arché which
is the underlying principle and true condition of
the universe and which may be the same as the true
nature of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; Tib. chönyi
[chos nyid]) or perhaps the all-encompassing space
in which phenomena manifest (Skt. dharmadhātu;
Tib. chöjing [chos dbyings]) of Mahāyāna Buddhism,
which does not exclude anything and has no limits
(so that, as Nāgārjuna made it clear, it cannot enter into the concept of being, that of nonbeing, that
of both-being-and-nonbeing or that of neither-being-nor-nonbeing)—and which is an absolute that as
such is impossible to eradicate. Yet on the other hand
he asserted it to be a phenomenon that is elicited
whenever we think of, listen or pronounce the word
being—thus contradicting its identification with the
arché, for whatever the mind conceives has limits
(for it is defined by proximate gender [genus proximum] and specific difference [differentiam specificam]), and therefore could not be the limitless arché,
dharmatā or dharmadhātu. Furthermore, as shown
elsewhere (Capriles 2007a vol. I, 2007c, and other of
my works), that which manifests when one thinks
of, listens to, or pronounces the word “being” is the
most basic delusive appearance of samsāra. (In the
same work, on the basis of several of Heidegger’s key
works, I exposed what from the standpoint of Buddhism and Dzogchen are the German philosopher’s
core philosophical errors, and discuss the numerous
books giving proof of the influence he received from
Buddhism and to some extent from Daoism, as well
as of the fact that he believed his philosophy to be
congruent with the systems in question.)
54. In Sartre (1980) the French philosopher does not
reduce being to the phenomenon of being (in his
view [Sartre, 1980] the phenomenon of being is not
the being of the phenomenon), but implies it to be
a kind of absolute that precedes human experience

57. Sartre defined the holon in a way that makes it
seem the same as Awakening, even though his definition of the term is internally contradictory—this
being the reason why I had to redefine it (Capriles,
2007a Vol. I, 2012). In fact, Sartre used the term
holon in a sense very different from Koestler’s
(1967; Koestler & Smythies, 1970), to designate
the Totality characterized by fullness, plenitude,
and coincidence with itself that being-for-Self tries
to attain through all of its endeavors, which involves what the French philosopher inaccurately
called the “translucency of consciousness proper
to being-for-Self ” simultaneously with the “coincidence with itself ” characteristic of being-in-itself,
and which is beyond the duality between these two
modes of being. Sartre likened this Totality unto
the God of Catholic theologians, and the characteristics he attributed to it coincide with those of
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and is independent from the latter (in fact, since he
asserts the being of the human individual that he
calls être-pour-soi to arise in [preexisting] being,
in his view being cannot depend on human experience). Although he avoided the error of making of
the absolute an “absolute of knowledge,” effectively
deconstructed the Cartesian-Husserlian cogito, and
offered concepts and descriptions I have used to
great profit in various works (Capriles, 1994, 2007a
vol. I, 2012), he breached the phenomenological epoché in various ways. Cf. Capriles (2007a Vol. I).
55. For a short discussion of the way in which Sartre
managed this, cf. Capriles (2010); for an in-depth
treatment, cf. Capriles (2007a Vol. I) and perhaps
also Capriles (2004).
56. However, Sartre’s holon, soi or Self is definitively
not Aristotle’s immovable motor, which was for the
Greek philosopher the final cause (telos) of human
existence. In Sartre (1980), pp. 137-8, one reads:
The relation between value and the for-Self is
very particular: [value] is the being that [the forSelf] is to be insofar as it is the foundation of its
own nothingness of being [i.e. nonbeing]. And
if [the for-Self] is to be this being, it is not so
under an external constraint, or because value,
like Aristotle’s first motor, would exert upon it
a de facto attraction, or by virtue of a character
received from its being; rather, it is that it makes
itself be in its being as having to be this being.

Awakening—except for some basic problems in his
definition that were problematized and resolved in
Capriles, 2007a Vol. I, and for the fact that Sartre
deemed it to be impossible to attain.
In fact, Sartre deemed the holon to be unattainable, and throughout his books he dealt solely
with the experiences and ontological structures of
samsāra; etc. However, he was right in noting that
all that being-for-Self does for attaining the Self /
holon maintains it as being-for-Self and thus as being-at-a-distance-from-the-Self / holon—this being
the reason why he asserted being-for-Self to be unhappy consciousness unable to overcome its inherent
condition of unhappiness. Thus being-for-Self has
no choice but to elude this unhappiness by means
of bad faith (self-deceit)—authenticity (in the sense
of not eluding anguish and shame by means of bad
faith) being therefore, in Sartre’s view, impossible to
achieve in a continuous way.
58. This term was coined by Derrida for expressing a
particular type of difference (différance), which he
said is rather the condition of possibility of difference; he made this term differ in spelling but not
in pronunciation from the French term différence
(“difference”) in order to mark a sharp difference
of meaning. As just noted, différance is not merely difference; it is supposed to be that which makes
differences possible and which constitutes all signs
as signs (i.e., as something that refers to something
supposedly different from itself). In order to further
explain what is différance I would have to use other Derridean terms and explanations which then
would need to be explained, so I direct readers who
are not familiar with Derrida’s thought to Capriles
(2007a Vol. III).
59. In fact, no one could deny that throughout his works
Derrida has outlined an ontology. For a sample of
how this is so, suffice to mention his statement that,
“the thing itself is a sign.” He wrote (Derrida, 1967,
in the Engligh version [1976 / 1998], Ch. Linguistics
and Grammatology, p. 49):

ful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such
a signified. Now Peirce considers the indefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows us
to recognise that we are indeed dealing with a
system of signs. What broaches the movement
of signification is what makes its interruption
impossible. The thing itself is a sign.
De-ontologizing entities itself implies and bears
an ontological position according to which there are
no ultimate, truly existing entities as such—which
would make of Derrida’s philosophy a meta-ontology as I have defined the term (Capriles, 2007a Vol.
I, etc.) if this de-ontologization were brought to its
last consequences, and if it involved methods for dissolving the experience of entities as ultimate, truly
existing as such.
60. These questions occur in several places in the Nikāyas:
they are discussed in detail in Khuddaka Nikāya, III:
Udāna; and they appear twice in Majjimanikāya,
I [sutta 72]; once in Samyuttakāya, III and once
in Samyuttakāya, IV; once in Dīghanikāya 9
[Potthapāda Sutta] and once in Dīghanikāya 29
[Pāsādika Sutta]. For his part, Nāgārjuna discussed
them in Mūlamādhyamakakārikāh, XXVII, and—
if the Chinese were right that he authored the
Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra—also in the latter.
61. The event(s) of nirvān. a could be equally regarded as
countless or as a single one, for although in nirvān. a
no differences apply, language has to distinguish
among different moments. Thus metaphenomenon
is as valid and as wrong as metaphenomena—terms
in which the prefix meta indicates that they are not
mere appearance (phainómenon), as they unveil the
true condition of reality.
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called the de-construction of the transcendental
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place a reassuring end to the reference from sign
to sign. I have identified logocentrism and the
metaphysics of presence as the exigent, power-
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